توقف إيران الآن
كل ما يتطلبه الأمر ليسود الشر هو ألا يفعل الطيبون شيئًا
حملة إيران للنصر والإخضاع والقتل
تمت كتابة هذا القسم وبحثه بواسطة المتحدة ضد إيران النووية
ويمكن العثور عليها في موقع الويب الخاص بهم
منذ إنشائها في عام 1979 ، سعت جمهورية إيران الإسلامية بقوة إلى "تصدير" ثورتها الإسلامية وإعادة تشكيل الشرق الأوسط تحت سيطرتها. كانت الطريقة الأساسية لإيران في تمكين نفسها هي ترسيخ الوكلاء الموالين لها في المنطقة ، وهو ما فعلته بأكبر قدر من النجاح مع حزب الله في لبنان ، ومؤخراً في العراق وسوريا واليمن وغزة.
وحيث لم يتمكن وكلاءها من ترسيخ جذورهم ، انخرطت إيران في أنشطة تخريبية لتقويض منافسيها وتعزيز نفوذها ، كما فعلت في المملكة العربية السعودية والبحرين والكويت وأفغانستان.
سعي إيران للهيمنة الإقليمية تسبب في عدم استقرار هائل في جميع أنحاء الشرق الأوسط ، مما أدى إلى تأجيج الانقسامات الطائفية وإشعال حروب مدمرة خلفت مئات الآلاف من القتلى.
العراق
مقدمة
منذ سقوط نظام صدام حسين عام 2003 ، شنت إيران حربًا بالوكالة في العراق حيث سعت إلى زيادة نفوذها بشكل كبير وطرد الوجود العسكري الأمريكي من البلاد. سعي إيران للفوز بالصدارة في العراق هو عنصر مهم في مشروعها الإقليمي المهيمن لتصدير الثورة الإسلامية في جميع أنحاء الشرق الأوسط. يعتبر العراق أيضًا حلقة وصل مهمة في جهود إيران لإنشاء "هلال شيعي" يعمل وظيفيًا كجسر بري يربط طهران بلبنان والبحر الأبيض المتوسط ، مما يمكّن إيران من تسليح حزب الله ووكلائه الإقليميين بشكل أكثر كفاءة وفتكًا.
تقاسم حدود 900 ميل مع إيران ، كان العراق في ظل النظام البعثي السني لصدام حسين هو الخصم الجيوستراتيجي الأساسي لإيران. اعتبرت إيران الغزو الأمريكي في عام 2003 فرصة لتحويل عدوها إلى دولة عميلة وقاعدة لتوجيه الأنشطة الثورية في جميع أنحاء الشرق الأوسط. ولهذه الغاية ، سعت إيران إلى تنمية الولاء بين الأغلبية الشيعية في العراق ، سعيًا إلى الاستفادة من الهوية الطائفية المشتركة لتبرير تدخلها وترسيخ نفوذها في العراق.
من أجل تعزيز نفوذها ، تهدف إيران إلى إبقاء العراق ضعيفًا ومعتمدًا على طهران لأمنه. وقفت إيران وتسيطر على شبكة واسعة من الجماعات الشيعية المسلحة في العراق ، وتستخدم هؤلاء الوكلاء " لإذكاء التوترات الطائفية" وإثارة العنف السياسي ... وبذلك تضمن لنفسها دور الوسيط في العراق ". لقد مكنت هذه الإستراتيجية ذات الوجهين إيران من ترسيخ نفسها كـ " وسيط القوة الرئيسي " في العراق.
دعم المليشيات الشيعية
منذ بداية حرب العراق عام 2003 ، إيران بدعم وتدريب وتمويل الميليشيات الشيعية والمتمردون الشيعة من أجل "العمل من أجل هزيمة مذلة للولايات المتحدة". حتى وفاته بغارة أمريكية بطائرة مسيرة استهدفت موكبه أثناء مغادرته مطار بغداد الدولي في 3 كانون الثاني 2020 ، قائد فيلق القدس في الحرس الثوري الإيراني قاسم سليماني عمل كوكيل النفوذ الإيراني الرئيسي في العراق ، حيث أشرف على تدريب وتسليح وتنسيق الأنشطة القتالية لمختلف الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران العاملة في العراق. من خلال مزيج من المساعدات العسكرية والمال والمزايا والرشاوى والترهيب ، أصبح سليماني يمارس نفوذًا شخصيًا هائلًا على الميليشيات والأحزاب السياسية الشيعية في البلاد. تم احتجاز السياسيين فعليًا كرهائن لمطالب سليماني ، حيث يمكنه دعوة الميليشيات الخاضعة لقيادته لإثارة المتاعب إذا حاولوا عبوره.
زودت إيران هذه الجماعات بأسلحة مثل العبوات الناسفة ، التي كانت " القاتل الأول للقوات الأمريكية " في العراق. من أجل نقل هذه الأسلحة إلى العراق ، سيطرت إيران على عدد من عصابات تهريب الأسلحة. بحلول عام 2006 ، كان فيلق القدس ، الذراع العسكري خارج الحدود الإقليمية للحرس الثوري الإيراني ، قد طور " شبكة واسعة النطاق لنقل وتوزيع الأسلحة من إيران إلى العراق عبر منطقة إيلام في غرب إيران ".
تجلت موافقة إيران على الميليشيات بشكل واضح مع التطور من الهجمات البدائية بالعبوات الناسفة البدائية (IED) على أفراد الخدمة الأمريكية إلى هجمات القذائف المتفجرة الفتاكة (EFP) ، والتي يصر المسؤولون العسكريون الأمريكيون على تعقيدها على الإشارة إلى الأصول الإيرانية. إجمالاً ، وجدت وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية أن الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران هي المسؤولة عن ذلك 603 حالة وفاة بين الجنود الأمريكيين بين عامي 2003 و 2011 ، وهو ما يمثل واحدًا من كل ستة ضحايا أمريكيين خلال تلك الفترة. كما أودى العنف الطائفي الذي ساعدت إيران في إطلاقه بحياة عشرات الآلاف من المدنيين العراقيين في السنوات التي أعقبت الغزو.
بحسب الدولة الأمريكية تقارير وزارة الخارجية حول الإرهاب لعام 2019 ، يُعتقد أن الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران مسؤولة عن أكثر من اثني عشر هجومًا صاروخيًا أو نيرانًا غير مباشرة استهدفت أهدافًا للولايات المتحدة أو التحالف في العراق في عام 2019 ، بما في ذلك هجوم 27 ديسمبر الذي شنت فيه كتائب حزب الله أكثر من 30 هجومًا. سقوط صواريخ على قاعدة عراقية تستضيف القوات الأمريكية في كركوك ، مما أسفر عن مقتل مقاول أمريكي وإصابة عدد من عناصر الخدمة الأمريكية والعراقية.
في 5 مارس 2019 ، وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية معين حركة حزب الله النجباء (HHN) ، وهي جماعة تعمل بالوكالة عن إيران تأسست عام 2013 مع دعم مباشر من الحرس الثوري الإيراني . HHN هي ميليشيا عراقية مدعومة من إيران تمولها الحكومة العراقية ولكنها لا تخضع لسيطرة الحكومة العراقية. وقد HHN علنا تعهدوا بالولاء لإيران والزعيم الإيراني الأعلى آية الله خامنئي. كان مؤسس الجماعة ، أكرم الكعبي ، أحد مؤسسي ميليشيا عصائب أهل الحق المدعومة من الحرس الثوري الإيراني والعديد من مقاتلي الجماعة أعضاء سابقون في عصائب أهل الحق وكتائب حزب الله. الكعبي علنا اعترف في عام 2015 أن "الدعم الفني واللوجستي يأتي من الجمهورية الإسلامية [الإيرانية]." تنشط المجموعة في سوريا أيضًا ، ويزعم المسؤولون العراقيون أنها " تساعد طهران في إنشاء طريق إمداد عبر العراق إلى دمشق ".
في 3 كانون الثاني (يناير) 2020 ، أعلنت وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية معين عصائب أهل الحق (AAH) بموجب المادة 219 من قانون الهجرة والجنسية ، وصنفت قادتها قيس وليث الخزعلي كإرهابيين عالميين مصنفين بشكل خاص بموجب الأمر التنفيذي 13224. في بيان ، زعم وزير الخارجية مايك بومبيو ، إن عصائب أهل الحق وقادتها وكلاء عنيفون للجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية. وهم يتصرفون نيابة عن أسيادهم في طهران ، ويستخدمون العنف والإرهاب لتعزيز جهود النظام الإيراني لتقويض السيادة العراقية ".
محاربة داعش
أثار استيلاء إيران العدائي على العراق ردود فعل طائفية ، مما أدى إلى صعود وقوة تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية (داعش). في عام 2014 ، في ذروة قوة داعش ، استولى التنظيم على الموصل مع القليل من المقاومة من القوات الحكومية العراقية وبدأ في التقدم نحو ضواحي بغداد. في ذلك الوقت ، تحول تركيز إيران الأساسي إلى سوريا ، وحولت إيران الكثير من أفراد الميليشيات الشيعية إلى محاولة إنقاذ نظام الأسد. عندما تطلب وضع داعش التحرك ، أمر سليماني المليشيات العراقية بعبور الحدود السورية مرة أخرى لإنقاذ العراق.
استخدمت إيران الحرب ضد داعش ذريعة لترسيخ مسؤولي الحرس الثوري الإيراني في العراق وزيادة دعمها للجماعات المسلحة الشيعية. الموالية لآية الله خامنئي . وبالتعاون مع الحكومة العراقية ، ساعد سليماني في الوقوف في وجه قوات الحشد الشعبي ، وهي منظمة جامعة لميليشيات يغلب عليها الشيعة نسقت مع الحكومة المركزية العراقية في القتال ضد داعش. في حين أن قوات الحشد الشعبي ليست كلها متحالفة مع إيران ، حول 50 ميليشيا شيعية مدعومة من إيران بما في ذلك بعض الجماعات الأكبر والأكثر تمويلًا والأكثر تسليحًا. أدى إنشاء هيكل قيادة قوات الحشد الشعبي وتكامله مع الحكومة المركزية العراقية إلى تنسيق غير مسبوق بين الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران وساعد على ترسيخ السيطرة الإيرانية على الشؤون العراقية.
تقارير عن عدد القتلى من جنود الحرس الثوري الإيراني أثناء القتال في العراق مزيد من إظهار التدخلات الإيرانية المكثفة في المنطقة. لقد زودت إيران العراق بـ ما قيمته 10 مليارات دولار من الأسلحة ، بما في ذلك على الأرجح دبابات T-72S وجيب سفير وبنادق قنص صياد .
ونتيجة لهذه التدخلات ضد داعش ، وصل النفوذ الإيراني في العراق إلى "مستوى غير مسبوق". وبحسب علي يونوسي ، مستشار المرشد الأعلى الإيراني خامنئي ، "إيران إمبراطورية مرة أخرى أخيرًا ، وعاصمتها بغداد". وزعم عضو في البرلمان الإيراني ادعاء مماثل ، معلنا أن بغداد " وقعت في أيدي إيران وينتمي إلى الثورة الإسلامية الإيرانية ". كما ردد سليماني هذه المشاعر متفاخرًا ، " نشهد تصدير الثورة الإسلامية في جميع أنحاء المنطقة ... من البحرين والعراق إلى سوريا واليمن وشمال إفريقيا".
انخرطت الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران في انتهاكات منهجية لحقوق الإنسان ووحشية تنافست مع داعش عندما طهرت أراضي داعش. مليشيات شيعية عراقية زُعم أنهم شاركوا في الاغتيالات خارج نطاق القضاء ، والإعدام بإجراءات موجزة ، والاختطاف ، والتعذيب لكل من المقاتلين والمدنيين ، بما في ذلك الأطفال.
نظرًا للقوة المسلحة والوحشية التي تمارسها الميليشيات الشيعية داخل قوات الحشد الشعبي ، فقد أصبحت قوتها تتفوق على سلطة الحكومة المركزية ، مما دفع المسؤولين العراقيين إما إلى الاستسلام واسترضاء قوات الحشد الشعبي ، أو مواجهة الانتقام. أشاد رئيس الوزراء العراقي الأسبق ، حيدر العبادي ، بإيران في دافوس عام 2015 لانطلاقها للدفاع عن العراق وحتى. خص قاسم سليماني كحليف في القتال ضد داعش . يقال أن هناك حول ما بين 80 إلى 100 ألف مقاتل شيعي متحالف مع إيران داخل العراق اليوم ، ولا تملك الحكومة سوى القليل من الملاذ لوضع الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران ، والتي ترغب في الاحتفاظ باستقلالها ، تحت قيادتها. إن البنية التحتية للميليشيات الشيعية هي التي توفر لإيران وسيلة لتهديد المصالح الأمريكية في أعقاب انسحاب الولايات المتحدة من الاتفاق النووي الإيراني. بناءً على طلب من طهران ، تم تفعيل هذه الميليشيات للرد على حملة "الضغط الأقصى" لإدارة ترامب ، مهاجمة مصالح الولايات المتحدة والطاقة في العراق . رويترز ذكرت في أغسطس 2018 ، نقلت إيران مؤخرًا صواريخ باليستية قصيرة المدى إلى حلفائها في العراق. هذه الأنواع من الصواريخ تضمن زلزال ، فتح 110 ، ذو الفقار ، والتي يمكن أن تقطع جميعها من 200 إلى 700 كم. هذا النطاق أماكن حلفاء الولايات المتحدة - إسرائيل والمملكة العربية السعودية - في متناول اليد. في الواقع ، اضطرت الحكومة الأمريكية إلى إغلاق قنصليتها في البصرة في سبتمبر 2018 بعد الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران مطرود صواريخ على المجمع.
أدى نقل إيران للصواريخ الباليستية إلى وكلائها ، وإنشاء مستودعات أسلحة في العراق ، وتحويل البلاد إلى مسار شحن للأسلحة إلى نظام الأسد وحزب الله إلى مزيد من تقويض السيادة العراقية ، مما يهدد احتكار الحكومة المركزية لاستخدام القوة. لقد دعت هذه الاستفزازات الانتقام من إسرائيل ، مما يسلط الضوء على استعداد إيران لتخريب أمن العراق من أجل غاياتها الشائنة.
النفوذ السياسي والاقتصادي
القوة الحركية لهذه الميليشيات تشتري النفوذ في السياسة العراقية. السفارة الإيرانية في بغداد هي مركز لمكائد الملالي في العراق - وتحديداً لأن سفير إيران في العراق إيراج مسجدي هو نفسه. جنرال سابق في فيلق القدس وشغل منصب كبير مستشاري قائد فيلق القدس قاسم سليماني. من هذا المنبر ، تمارس طهران نفوذاً قوياً على اتجاه السياسة العراقية.
بعد الانتخابات البرلمانية في مايو 2018 ، والتي شهدت احتلال تحالف فتح المدعوم من إيران المرتبة الثانية في فرز الأصوات ، شاركت إيران وحلفاؤها بشكل وثيق في المفاوضات بشأن تشكيل الحكومة. على سبيل المثال ، مقتدى الصدر ، الذي جاء ائتلافه القومي سائرون في المرتبة الأولى في الانتخابات ، سافرت إلى لبنان في سبتمبر 2018 حيث استضافه الأمين العام لحزب الله حسن نصر الله وقاسم سليماني للتوصل إلى إجماع حول من سيصبح رئيس الوزراء المقبل للعراق. واستقر الثلاثي على عادل عبد المهدي وزير النفط السابق ونائب رئيس العراق. بحسب مسربة إيرانية برقيات استخباراتية حصل عليها موقع Intercept ، عمل عبد المهدي بشكل وثيق مع إيران التي يعود تاريخها إلى الفترة التي قضاها في المنفى كمعارض لنظام صدام حسين وكوزير للنفط ، وكان له "علاقة خاصة مع الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية". تم الترحيب بعبد المهدي كمرشح حل وسط مقبول للولايات المتحدة والعراق ، لكن اختياره أبرز أنه لا يمكن لأي رئيس وزراء عراقي تولي السلطة دون دعم إيران. بينما وُصف المهدي بأنه تكنوقراط مستقل التفكير ، بعد توليه منصبه ، منح إيران وصولاً تفضيلياً لدائرته المقربة. في أكتوبر 2018 فقط 24 ساعة بعد أن أعلن أنه لن يجتمع مع وفود من السفارات الأجنبية لأن حكومته كانت في طور التشكيل - خوفًا من الظهور بمظهر غير لائق في عملية صنع القرار - استضاف السفير الإيراني إيراج مسجدي للمناقشة.
خارج المجال السياسي ، تحافظ إيران أيضًا على الاقتصاد تأثير فوق العراق. حسبما إلى السفير مسجدي ، ثاني أكبر سوق تصدير لإيران هو العراق ، حيث من المقرر أن تصل التجارة الثنائية إلى 8.5 مليار دولار في عام 2018 ، وتأمل إيران في زيادة حجم التجارة إلى 22 مليار دولار سنويًا. في الواقع ، كان على الولايات المتحدة باستمرار منح العراق دورية التنازل عن العقوبات الأمريكية أعادت الحكومة الأمريكية فرضها على إيران بعد انسحابها من الاتفاق النووي الإيراني الذي سمح لها باستيراد الغاز والكهرباء من إيران.
عقدة إضافية للنفوذ الإيراني هي تطويرها المزارات الشيعية في العراق. وفقًا لرويترز في ديسمبر 2020 في التقرير ، أنفقت إيران مئات الملايين من الدولارات على بناء وتحديث المواقع الدينية في العراق. تقف شركات البناء المرتبطة بالمؤسسات الخيرية المملوكة للحرس الثوري الإيراني وراء طفرة البناء. يُطلق على المنظمة الأساسية التي تشرف على تطوير الأضرحة اسم المقر الرئيسي لإعادة بناء الأماكن المقدسة. أسسها المرشد الأعلى خامنئي ويديرها الحرس الثوري الإيراني. هذه الترتيبات هي جزء من جهود خامنئي لإقامة روابط رعاية مع الحرس الثوري الإيراني ، وإثراء الحرس وضمان ولائهم للمرشد الأعلى. في مارس 2020 ، تم فرض عقوبات على المنظمة من قبل وزارة الخزانة الأمريكية التي زعمت أنها خاضعة لسيطرة فيلق القدس وكانت بمثابة واجهة لتوجيه المساعدات الفتاكة للوكلاء المدعومين من إيران ، والأنشطة الاستخباراتية ، وغسيل الأموال.
يمر ملايين الحجاج عبر الأضرحة في العراق كل عام ، مما يمنح إيران الفرصة للتبشير بأيديولوجيتها الخمينية. تسعى إيران على المدى الطويل للتأثير على اختيار خليفة آية الله علي السيستاني ، أقوى رجل دين شيعي في العراق ومصدر منافس لمحاكاة المسلمين الشيعة لخامنئي. من شأن أي خليفة أكثر ملاءمة لإيديولوجية الدولة في النجف أن يعزز النفوذ الثقافي والسياسي الإيراني في العراق على المدى الطويل. وبالتالي ، حتى في الوقت الذي تواجه فيه ضغوطًا اقتصادية هائلة بسبب العقوبات ، فقد رأت إيران أنه من المناسب تحويل مبالغ ضخمة من الأموال لدعم التنمية في العراق.
في تحركات تظهر النفوذ الايراني في العراق وزارة الخزانة الامريكية تقرها سفير إيران في العراق إيراج مسجدي كإرهابي عالمي مُصنف بشكل خاص ثم رئيس لجنة الحشد الشعبي ومستشار الأمن القومي العراقي السابق فالح الفياض في ظل قانون ماغنتسكي العالمي لانتهاكات حقوق الإنسان. كان تعيين مسجدي مهمًا ، لا سيما لتسليط الضوء على إدراج إيران لجنرالات فيلق القدس في المناصب الدبلوماسية الإيرانية. كانت العقوبة على الفياض مهمة أيضًا نظرًا لتاريخه وحقيقة أن الفياض قد زار واشنطن في الماضي من أجل مناقشة استقرار العراق. لكن الفياض كان مقربًا من إيران منذ فترة طويلة مؤخرًا سفر إلى طهران لإحياء الذكرى الأولى لوفاة سليماني.
رد فعل عنيف
جعلت سيطرة إيران على الميليشيات الشيعية منها وسيط القوة العسكري والسياسي والدبلوماسي المهيمن في العراق ، لكن سعيها للهيمنة وتخريب المصالح العراقية لصالحها أضعف الحكومة المركزية العراقية وأعاق قدرتها على توفير الرفاه. من مواطنيها. في غضون ذلك ، فشل مشروع إيران لزراعة روابط المحسوبية بين السكان الشيعة في العراق من خلال ميليشياتها ، التي تقدم الخدمات الاجتماعية بالإضافة إلى الأمن ، في أن يتجذر ، حيث لا يزال انتشار البطالة والحرمان الاقتصادي هو القاعدة. لقد ثبت أن التبجح الثوري الإيراني غير كافٍ لتجاوز عدم كفائتها في الحكم الأساسي ، وكانت النتيجة رد فعل عنيف ضد طهران انتقل إلى حركة احتجاجية جماهيرية مستمر منذ أكتوبر 2019.
شهدت الاحتجاجات التي تجتاح العراق خروج عشرات الآلاف من المتظاهرين إلى الشوارع للتعبير عن استيائهم من حكومة رئيس الوزراء عادل عبد المهدي ، وهي طبقة من النخب السياسية المنفصلة ، والميليشيات المدعومة من إيران. في كثير من الأحيان ، وضعت هذه القوى مصالح إيران على الصالح العام ، على سبيل المثال توجيه موارد العراق النفطية لصالح طهران بينما يفتقر المواطنون العراقيون إلى الرعاية الصحية والوظائف وفرص التعليم والكهرباء المستمرة ومياه الشرب النظيفة. والجدير بالذكر أن المتظاهرين العراقيين هم من الشيعة بشكل حصري تقريبًا ، مما يدل على أن مناورات إيران السياسية والعسكرية فشلت في أن تترجم إلى كسب قلوب وعقول الجمهور الأساسي الذي تحتاجه لمواصلة فرض نفوذها في العراق. كانت الدعوات إلى حوكمة أكثر شمولية من بين مطالب المحتجين ، مما سلط الضوء على عدم شعبية النهج الطائفي الواضح في إيران.
ردت إيران على حركة الاحتجاج العراقية بالقمع ، فأرسلت قائد فيلق القدس السابق قاسم سليماني إلى بغداد فور بدء الاحتجاجات في تقديم المشورة للسياسيين والمسؤولين الأمنيين العراقيين بشأن أفضل ممارساته لقمع الاضطرابات. وبحسب مسؤولين أمنيين عراقيين حضروا الاجتماع ، قال سليماني ، الذي ترأس الاجتماع مكان رئيس الوزراء عبد المهدي ، للحاضرين: " نحن في إيران نعرف كيف نتعامل مع الاحتجاجات. حدث هذا في إيران وسيطرنا عليه ".
منذ إعلان سليماني المشؤوم ، ردت قوات الحشد الشعبي وقوات الأمن العراقية بقوة مفرطة وقاتلة لقمع المظاهرات. بحلول نهاية ديسمبر 2019 ، تقريبًا قُتل 500 متظاهر ، وجرح الآلاف ، واعتقل حوالي 2800 . التوجيه بالرد على الاحتجاجات بالذخيرة الحية صادر بوضوح من طهران ، وتشير العديد من التقارير إلى أن القوات المدعومة من إيران كانت وراء أكثر الاشتباكات دموية. على سبيل المثال ، أفادت وكالة رويترز أن عناصر قوات الحشد الشعبي المقربة من إيران ، والذين يقدمون تقاريرهم مباشرة إلى قادة الميليشيات التابعة لهم بدلاً من القائد العام للقوات المسلحة العراقية ، قد انتشروا. قناصة على اسطح المنازل في بغداد تطل على مظاهرات بعد أيام قليلة من اندلاع الاضطرابات التي أسفرت عن مقتل العشرات.
وأثناء توجيهه لقمع الاحتجاجات العراقية ، أمر سليماني أيضًا الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران الخاضعة لسيطرته بالاضطلاع بقمع الاحتجاجات العراقية. حملة منسقة من الهجمات الصاروخية التي تستهدف أهدافاً عسكرية أمريكية في البلاد. وبحسب مسؤول عسكري أمريكي ، فإن التحليل الجنائي للصواريخ والقاذفات المستخدمة خلال موجة ما لا يقل عن عشر هجمات تشير إلى تورط مليشيات شيعية ، أبرزها عصائب أهل الحق و كتائب حزب الله . في 27 كانون أول / ديسمبر 2019 أطلقت أكثر من 30 صاروخا على قاعدة عسكرية عراقية قرب كركوك ، ما أدى إلى مقتل مقاول أمريكي وإصابة أربعة جنود أمريكيين واثنين من قوات الأمن العراقية. الولايات المتحدة المتهم حزب KH مسؤول عن الهجوم ، ورد بشن ضربات ضد 5 أهداف من كتائب حزب الله في العراق وسوريا بما في ذلك مستودعات الأسلحة ومراكز القيادة والسيطرة. وبحسب ما ورد قتلت الضربات الأمريكية ما لا يقل عن 25 من مقاتلي كتائب حزب الله.
في 31 كانون أول / ديسمبر 2019 ، اعتصم متظاهرون بينهم أعضاء وأنصار كتائب حزب الله ، حاول اقتحام السفارة الأمريكية في بغداد . ورشق المتظاهرون الحجارة وأشعلوا النار في مركز أمني ، مما دفع حراس السفارة للرد بالقنابل الصوتية والغاز المسيل للدموع. انسحب أنصار الميليشيا من السفارة بعد أن تحدث معهم قادة بارزون حسبما ورد. في 1 كانون الثاني / يناير 2020 ، بناء على أوامر من المتحدث السياسي باسم كتائب حزب الله محمد محيي ، تفرق آلاف المتظاهرين من السفارة الأمريكية في بغداد.
في الساعات الأولى من صباح 3 يناير / كانون الثاني 2020 ، أعطى الرئيس ترامب الضوء الأخضر لضربة بطائرة بدون طيار استهدفت موكب سليماني بعد وقت قصير من وصوله إلى بغداد. كما قُتل في الغارة رئيس حزب كتائب حزب الله أبو مهدي المهندس ، الذي شغل أيضًا منصب نائب رئيس قوات الحشد الشعبي. على الرغم من وفاتهم ، ستستمر الشبكة القوية من الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران في الحفاظ على ثباتها في العراق ، وتدعم نفوذ إيران بشكل متزايد من خلال القمع.
تعهدت القيادة الإيرانية بارتكاب عمليات انتقامية مدمرة ضد الولايات المتحدة بسبب عملية قتل سليماني ، وتابعت هذا التهديد بإطلاق وابل من أكثر من عشرات الصواريخ البالستية على قاعدتين جويتين عراقيتين إيواء القوات الأمريكية في الساعات الأولى من صباح يوم 8 يناير ، جرح 11 جنود أمريكيون.
بعد الهجوم ، سادت فترة من الهدوء ، على الرغم من أن إيران أشارت إلى أنه من المحتمل أن تضرب المصالح الأمريكية مرة أخرى في المستقبل الذي تختاره. أشار المرشد الأعلى لإيران ، آية الله علي خامنئي ، إلى أنه بينما يمثل الهجوم بالصواريخ الباليستية " صفعة على الوجه " للولايات المتحدة ، فإن "العمل العسكري مثل هذا الهجوم (الصاروخي الباليستي) ليس كافياً" ، متعهداً برفض الدخول في مفاوضات و الاستمرار في مواجهة الولايات المتحدة حتى يطرد نفوذها من المنطقة. في الفترة الفاصلة ، حافظ قادة إيران على قرع طبول مستمر من خطاب التهديد الموجه إلى الولايات المتحدة ، حيث تعهد خليفة سليماني ، إسماعيل قاآني ، على سبيل المثال بـ " ضرب عدوه بطريقة رجولية ".
في 11 آذار / مارس 2020 تم كسر التهدئة على أنها ميليشيات مدعومة من إيران أطلقت صاروخ كاتيوشا استهداف القوات الأمريكية وقوات التحالف المتمركزة في معسكر التاجي ، 17 ميلا شمال بغداد. وأسفر الهجوم عن مقتل جنديين أمريكيين وجندي بريطاني ، وإصابة اثني عشر جنديًا آخر. تجاوز الهجوم الخط الأحمر الأمريكي حيث قتل الجنود الأمريكيين ، مما أدى مرة أخرى إلى زيادة التوترات بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران. تزامن الهجوم مع عيد ميلاد قاسم سليماني الثالث والستين ، لكن من غير الواضح ما إذا كان الهجوم قد صدر مباشرة من إيران ، حيث من المحتمل أن يكون اغتيال سليماني قد أثر على القيادة والسيطرة بين طهران ووكلائها في العراق. في أعقاب الهجوم ، نُفِّذت غارات جوية حول معبر أبوكمال الحدودي بين سوريا والعراق ، حيث يُعرف بوجود قوي للميليشيات المدعومة من إيران. لم تعلن الولايات المتحدة مسؤوليتها عن الضربات الجوية في هذا الوقت.
في أعقاب مقتل سليماني ، فعلت الحركة الاحتجاجية في العراق استمرت في اكتساب القوة ، مع تنفيس المتظاهرين عن إحباطهم من أن تجاهل إيران للسيادة العراقية قد أوقع بلادهم بشكل متزايد في شرك حرب بالوكالة بين إيران وخلف سليماني الأمريكي كقائد لفيلق القدس ، العميد. اسماعيل قاآني كافح للسيطرة على العراق بنفس الطريقة التي عانى بها سليماني. قاآني ، الذي ركز في السابق بشكل أساسي على أفغانستان وباكستان وآسيا الوسطى ، يفتقر إلى العلاقات مع القادة السياسيين والميليشيات العراقيين من جميع الأطياف التي زرعها سليماني ، الذي كان يخشى عالميًا إن لم يكن محترمًا.
على هذا النحو ، كان على حزب الله أن يملأ الفراغ الناجم عن مقتل سليماني ، وتولى تنسيق عمليات الميليشيات في العراق. في أبريل 2020 ، وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية أعلن مكافأة قدرها 10 ملايين دولار مقابل معلومات عن عضو حزب الله الشيخ محمد الكوثراني ، زاعمًا أنه "استولى على بعض التنسيق السياسي للجماعات شبه العسكرية المتحالفة مع إيران" والتي كانت في السابق من اختصاص سليماني. نتيجة لذلك ، تدهورت قيادة طهران وسيطرتها على الميليشيات المختلفة التي تدعمها. كما تراجعت قدرتها على إملاء النتائج في الشؤون السياسية العراقية.
في أواخر آذار (مارس) 2020 ، قام قاآني بأول زيارة له إلى بغداد سعياً منه إلى إرساء استمرارية مع سلفه وإعادة تأكيد نفوذ فيلق القدس. كانت زيارته ينظر إليها على نطاق واسع على أنها فاشلة. لقد سعى إلى توحيد الميليشيات العراقية والفصائل السياسية في دعم رئيس وزراء مناهض لأمريكا وموالي لإيران ، لكن العراق اختار في النهاية رئيس المخابرات السابق مصطفى الكاظمي ، الذي يُنظر إليه على أنه داعم للمصالح الأمريكية. وتجاهل مقتدى الصدر قاآني في زيارته ورفض مقابلته. لم يكن مثل هذا الازدراء غير مسموع بالنسبة لسليماني ، وأظهر أن طهران لم تعد تسيطر على الخوف والاحترام اللذين ولدتهما في السابق.
في الأشهر الأخيرة من إدارة ترامب ، سعت إيران إلى كبح جماح الميليشيات العراقية التي تدعمها من مهاجمة الولايات المتحدة ، سعيًا إلى الانتظار حتى انتهاء الوقت وتجنب أي تصعيد. في نوفمبر 2020 ، ورد أن قاآني زار بيروت للقاء زعيم حزب الله حسن نصر الله لتأمين مساعدته في كبح جماح الميليشيات العراقية المدعومة من إيران. وتوجه قاآني بعد ذلك إلى بغداد للقاء رئيس الوزراء وعدد من قادة المليشيات لحثهم على ضبط النفس. في حين أن بعض الميليشيات قد اتبعت أوامر طهران ، وعلى الأخص كتائب حزب الله ، تحدى البعض الآخر طهران علنًا. أجرى زعيم عصائب أهل الحق ، قيس الخزعلي ، مقابلة تلفزيونية بعد زيارة قاآني تعهد فيها بمواصلة مواجهة الولايات المتحدة ، معلنا أن "الأمريكان يحتلون بلادنا وليس بلدكم. لن نستمع إليكم بعد الآن لأن دوافعنا قومية مئة بالمئة. وانتهت الهدنة مع الامريكيين لعدم الوفاء بشروطها ".
منذ زيارة قاآني ، واصلت المليشيات العراقية شن هجمات على المصالح الأمريكية. 17 تشرين ثاني / نوفمبر 2020: استهدف مسلحون السفارة الأمريكية بوابل من الصواريخ. في 10 ديسمبر / كانون الأول ، تعرضت قافلتان تحملان معدات لوجستية للتحالف بقيادة الولايات المتحدة لهجوم بقنابل على جانب الطريق. في 20 ديسمبر ، كانت السفارة المستهدفة بإطلاق 21 صاروخًا آخر ، في أكبر هجوم على المنطقة الخضراء منذ عقد. نددت كتائب حزب الله والفصائل الأخرى المقربة من إيران الانتهاكات المتكررة لوقف إطلاق النار الهش ، لكنها تظهر أن الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران لا تزال منقسمة في نهجها لمواجهة الولايات المتحدة وأنه في ظل قاآني ، لم يعد فيلق القدس قادرًا على ذلك. فرض الانضباط بين صفوفهم. قدم قاآني آخر يزور إلى العراق في ديسمبر ، حيث زعمت شبكة العالم الإخبارية أنها لا علاقة لها بهجوم 20 ديسمبر.
واصلت الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران شن هجمات ضد الوجود العسكري الأمريكي في العراق منذ أن تولى جوزيف بايدن الرئاسة الأمريكية ، على الأرجح كجزء من استراتيجية طهران لزيادة نفوذها وإجبار الولايات المتحدة على تقديم تنازلات أولية قبل استئناف الأسلحة النووية. مفاوضات.
في 15 فبراير 2021 ، انطلق مسلحون مشتبه بهم مدعومون من إيران وابل من 14 صاروخا استهدفت مجمعا عسكريا أمريكيا شديد التحصين في أربيل بكردستان العراق بثلاثة صواريخ أصابت القاعدة. قتل متعاقد مدني للجيش الأمريكي يحمل الجنسية الفلبينية ، ومدني عراقي توفي بعد أسبوع متأثرا بجروح أصيب بها في الهجوم. كان ما لا يقل عن ثمانية آخرين مصاب في الهجمات ، بما في ذلك جندي أمريكي وخمسة متعاقدين عسكريين. في 3 مارس / آذار ، أصدرت سلطات مكافحة الإرهاب الكردية اعترافات من أحد منفذي الهجوم الذي قال إنه نفذ الهجوم مع أفراد آخرين ينتمون إلى الميليشيا المدعومة من إيران. كتائب سيد الشهداء (KSS) ، وهي جزء من قوات الحشد الشعبي. وزعم المهاجم المشتبه به أيضًا أنه استخدم صواريخ إيرانية الصنع في الهجوم. يُعتقد أن KSS هو فرع له روابط تشغيلية لـ منظمة بدر . غالبًا ما تعرض دعاية المجموعة صورًا للمرشد الأعلى خامنئي ، مما يشير إلى ولاء الجماعة للنظام الإيراني.
بعد عدة أيام من هجوم أربيل ، أطلق مسلحون صواريخ على قاعدة بلد الجوية ، حيث تخدم شركة دفاع أمريكية طائرات مقاتلة عراقية ، وفي مجمع المنطقة الخضراء ببغداد ، حيث تقع السفارة الأمريكية. وردت الولايات المتحدة على تصعيد الهجمات العنيفة من قبل شن غارات جوية استهداف قوات الميليشيات المدعومة من إيران على الجانب السوري من معبر أبوكمال الحدودي بين العراق وسوريا في 25 شباط / فبراير 2021 ، وهو خيار تمت معايرته للرد على مزيد من العدوان الإيراني وردعه مع عدم إحداث صداع سياسي للحكومة المركزية العراقية. وبحسب المتحدث باسم البنتاغون ، جون كيربي ، فإن المنشآت المستهدفة كانت تستخدمه كتائب حزب الله وكتائب سيد الشهداء. في 3 مارس 2021 ، استُهدفت القوات الأمريكية مرة أخرى بوابل صاروخي من مسؤولي دفاع أمريكيين يصدق كانت قد أطلقتها كتائب حزب الله أو إحدى الميليشيات الموالية لإيران. أصيب مقاول أمريكي بنوبة قلبية قاتلة أثناء الهجوم.
يشكل استمرار عدم الاستقرار السياسي والاحتجاجات في العراق ، فضلاً عن الأعمال العدائية المتفرقة بين القوات العميلة المدعومة من إيران والولايات المتحدة ، تحديات هائلة لأولئك الذين يرغبون في استعادة السيادة والديمقراطية للعراق ، وهو وضع ستستمر إيران في استغلاله. في حين أن مقتل سليماني شكل انتكاسة لقدرة إيران على ممارسة نفوذها في العراق ، إلا أنها لا تزال تمارس نفوذًا كبيرًا على الميليشيات الرئيسية في قوات الحشد الشعبي ويمكنها حشد الجماعات لمواجهة الولايات المتحدة في الوقت الذي تختاره .
لبنان
الديناميكيات السياسية في لبنان
نال لبنان استقلاله عن فرنسا عام 1943. واستجابةً جزئياً للتطلعات القومية المارونية ، أنشأت فرنسا - التي كانت آنذاك سلطة الانتداب في السيطرة على الأراضي التي ستصبح سوريا ولبنان - ما يُعرف بدولة لبنان الكبير ، حيث جمعت بين متصرفية جبل لبنان ، موقع الاستيطان الماروني ، مع المناطق المجاورة ذات الغالبية المسلمة. وبينما جعل هذا الجيب الماروني قابلاً للحياة ، فقد شمل أيضًا مجموعات سكانية محتملة لها هويات وانتماءات تتعارض بشدة مع هويات الموارنة. قد يصبح هذا مصدر النسيج الاجتماعي المتنوع الفريد من نوعه في لبنان ، ولكن أيضًا سبب عدم الاستقرار الداخلي المزمن.
بُنيت السيادة المارونية في نظام لبنان المبكر. منح الميثاق الوطني لعام 1943 - وهو اتفاق غير رسمي يقسم السلطة السياسية الطائفية في البلاد - الموارنة أولوية المكان بناءً على تعداد عام 1932 ، عندما شكلت الطائفة المسيحية الشرقية أغلبية ، ومنح المسيحيين أقوى المناصب السياسية في البلاد و 6 : 5 أغلبية في البرلمان. كان هذا الإحصاء السكاني هو آخر تعداد يُجري لبنان على الإطلاق ، من أجل الحفاظ على وهم التوازن الطائفي وتجنب الصراع الديني.
كان للانقسام بين المسيحيين والمسلمين في لبنان تداعيات سياسية أوسع. كان الموارنة والعديد من الطوائف المسيحية الأصغر يتجهون نحو أوروبا والغرب. بشكل عام ، رفضوا العروبة وأنكروا أن يكون لبنان دولة عربية. ومع ذلك ، فبالنسبة للعديد من المسلمين اللبنانيين ، كانت بلادهم لا تزال جزءًا لا يتجزأ من سوريا الكبرى والعالم العربي والإسلامي الأوسع - وإذا لم تستطع البلدان التي تضم سوريا الكبرى إعادة توحيدها كدولة واحدة ، فيجب على الأقل أن تكون مرتبطة ارتباطًا وثيقًا ثقافيًا و سياسيا.
اشتدت التوترات الطائفية حول هوية لبنان بسبب تدفق اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بعد الحرب العربية الإسرائيلية عام 1948 وبعد طرد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية من الأردن في أوائل السبعينيات. عارض الموارنة بشدة تجنيس اللاجئين ، الأمر الذي كان سيقلب الموازين الطائفية الدقيقة في لبنان ضدهم. كان الهدف من اتفاقية القاهرة لعام 1969 ، التي أزالت مخيمات اللاجئين الفلسطينيين من سيطرة الدولة اللبنانية ، تخفيف التوترات اللبنانية الفلسطينية. وبدلاً من ذلك ، أدى الاتفاق إلى تصعيد الصراعات الطائفية من خلال السماح لمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية بإقامة دولة داخل دولة في لبنان ، مما أدى قريبًا إلى اشتباكات عنيفة مع الميليشيات المارونية. في عام 1975 ، أشعلت هذه المناوشات شرارة الحرب الأهلية اللبنانية الدموية ، والتي استمرت حتى عام 1990.
وقف السنة اللبنانيون والدروز ، المستائين من استمرار الهيمنة المارونية ، إلى جانب الفلسطينيين ضد أبناء وطنهم المسيحيين. انقسم الجيش اللبناني على أسس طائفية ، وسرعان ما ظهرت مجموعة أبجدية من الميليشيات الطائفية ، كل منها يدعو إلى مساعدة داعم أجنبي أو آخر - والأهم من ذلك ، سوريا وإسرائيل
لم تعترف سوريا أبدًا باستقلال لبنان بشكل صحيح ورأت في الحرب الأهلية فرصة لإعادة تأكيد سيطرتها على ذلك البلد وعكس آثار الانتداب الفرنسي. قامت إسرائيل المتحالفة مع حزب الكتائب المارونية بغزو البلاد لطرد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية من البلاد وتهيئة الظروف لتوقيع لبنان على اتفاقية سلام مع إسرائيل.
ستنجح إسرائيل في طرد منظمة التحرير ، لكن تطلعاتها السياسية انتهت بالفشل. على النقيض من ذلك ، برزت سوريا كقوة مهيمنة جديدة في لبنان بسبب اتفاق الطائف عام 1989 ، الذي أنهى الحرب الأهلية.
الآن ، لم يبق سوى بقايا التفوق الماروني في لبنان. منحت اتفاقية الطائف للمسلمين السنة والشيعة التكافؤ البرلماني مع المسيحيين وزادت صلاحيات المناصب الرئيسية المخصصة لهم - رئيس الوزراء ورئيس البرلمان - على حساب الرئاسة التي يسيطر عليها المارونيون.
إيران تزود حزب الله بالصواريخ التي تهدد إسرائيل.
الطائفية اللبنانية
الطائفية متأصلة في الحمض النووي الوطني للبنان. في حين أنها تمثل نسيج لبنان متعدد الأديان الذي يروج له كثيرًا ، إلا أنها أيضًا نتاج افتقار البلاد إلى هوية وطنية موحدة فوق دينية وتمنع إنشاء مثل هذه الهوية. وفقًا للميثاق الوطني اللبناني ، يتم تقسيم المناصب السياسية العليا في البلاد ليس على أساس الجدارة ، ولكن على أساس الطائفة: يجب أن يكون الرئيس دائمًا أقوى شخصية مسيحية مارونية ، ورئيس الوزراء أقوى سني ، ورئيس البرلمان أقوى شيعي. وبالمثل ، تتجمع الأحزاب السياسية في المقام الأول حول وتمثل الطوائف الدينية ، أو الانقسامات العائلية / الجغرافية داخل كل طائفة ، بدلاً من الاتفاق على القضايا أو الفلسفات السياسية.
حسّن اتفاق الطائف لعام 1989 ، الذي أنهى الحرب الأهلية اللبنانية ، آثار الطائفية من خلال تقسيم البرلمان بالتساوي بين المسلمين والمسيحيين ومنح بعض صلاحيات الرئيس المسيحي لرئيس الوزراء السني ورئيس البرلمان الشيعي. إلا أنه لم يقض على الكراهية والشكوك الطائفية القديمة ، ولم يحل الصراع على هوية لبنان الذي أدى إلى اندلاع الحرب الأهلية في البلاد. على العكس من ذلك ، يمكن القول إن هذا التغيير التجميلي ، من خلال التخفيف من أسوأ آثار الطائفية في لبنان ، قد رسخ هذا النظام بشكل أكبر.
وبالتالي فإن لبنان بلد يفتقر إلى هوية وطنية موحدة ، والقوى الأجنبية ، مثل إيران ، تقسم وتنتصر في هذا الفراغ بإذكاء أو استغلال المظالم أو الأحقاد الطائفية.
حزب الله: ذراع إيران الطويل في لبنان
لأكثر من ثلاثة عقود ، استغلت إيران هذه الطائفية - لا سيما مظالم الطائفة الشيعية اللبنانية وحرمانها من حقوقها - لتأسيس موطئ قدم قوي في لبنان. فوضى الحرب الأهلية في لبنان والعنف الذي تعرض له الشيعة خلال الغزو الإسرائيلي للبنان عام 1982 مكّنت طهران من تحفيز صعود التمديد الأجنبي الأول للثورة الإسلامية: حزب الله.
نما حزب الله إلى قوة مؤثرة في السياسة والمجتمع اللبنانيين. بمساعدة إيرانية ، ولكن أيضًا من خلال جهودها المستقلة المتزايدة ، أنتجت الجماعة جهازًا اجتماعيًا واسعًا في لبنان يلبي احتياجات مجتمعه. ذراع عسكري متنامٍ صمد أمام ثلاثة عقود من الصراع مع الجيش الإسرائيلي ؛ وحققت انتشارًا عالميًا وقوة سياسية متزايدة في الحكومة اللبنانية.
قد لا يكون لبنان وحزب الله مترادفين بعد - على الرغم من أن الحزب يطمح تدريجياً لتحقيق هذا الهدف - لكن حزب الله أكد سيطرته على أجزاء مهمة من صنع القرار اللبناني. بناءً على أوامر إيران ، أو لخدمة مصالحها ، تقرر المجموعة بحكم الأمر الواقع متى سيذهب لبنان إلى الحرب أو ينعم بالسلام ، كما هو الحال مع جولاته العديدة من الصراع مع إسرائيل أو القرار الأحادي الجانب لدخول الحرب الأهلية السورية. والجدير بالذكر أن هذا القرار لم يتخذ للدفاع عن لبنان من الجهاديين السنة كما يُزعم ، وإنما لإنقاذ نظام بشار الأسد حليف إيران.
حزب الله في السياسة اللبنانية
كما يؤكد حزب الله نفوذه الضخم على صنع القرار السياسي في لبنان. أصبحت المجموعة بارعة في شل النظام السياسي في لبنان لخدمة مصالحها. عندما تفشل المناورات السياسية لجأ حزب الله إلى القوة. على الرغم من وعودها بعدم توجيه أسلحتها إلى اللبنانيين ، في مايو 2008 ، قامت الجماعة بغزو واستيلاء على بيروت ردًا على قرار حكومي بإغلاق شبكة اتصالاتها وإبعاد رئيس الأمن الموالي لحزب الله من مطار رفيق الحريري الدولي في بيروت. تشير الأدلة أيضًا إلى تورط حزب الله في حملة اغتيالات ضد خصومه السياسيين - وأشهرها اغتيال رئيس الوزراء السابق رفيق الحريري عام 2005. يمكن لحزب الله أيضًا الاستفادة من دعمه الاجتماعي بين الشيعة لتعبئة أعضاء تلك الطائفة لتنفيذ أعمال عنف في الشوارع أو ببساطة إغلاق أجزاء كاملة من البلاد - كما حدث في الاحتجاجات السياسية في ديسمبر 2006 ، والتي أدت إلى استقالة الحكومة المدعومة من الولايات المتحدة. .
كما منعت لبنان من انتخاب رئيس لمدة عامين حتى استسلم خصومه وعينوا حليفه ميشال عون في عام 2016. وفي عام 2018 ، أطال التنظيم جهود لبنان لتشكيل حكومة جديدة من خلال دعم مطالب السنة الموالية لحزب الله بتمثيلهم فيها. حكومة الرئيس سعد الحريري ، في محاولة لإضعاف رئيس الوزراء وإجباره على التنازل عن شرعية الأصوات المؤيدة لحزب الله داخل طائفته.
كان حزب الله قوة منذ ذلك الوقت. على سبيل المثال ، دعمت وزيري صحة متتاليين - جميل جبق وحسن حمد. جبق ، على وجه الخصوص ، كان مقربًا من أمينها العام حسن نصر الله ، حيث عمل كطبيب شخصي له. وزارة الصحة ليست موقعا هزيلا في مجلس الوزراء - لديها رابع أكبر ميزانية. ناهيك عن الوزارات الأخرى التي شغلها حلفاؤها أو أعضاؤها في الحكومتين الأخيرتين ، على سبيل المثال ، وزارتي الصناعة والرياضة والشباب. وكان آخر رئيس للوزراء ، حسان دياب ، الذي انهارت حكومته بعد أقل من عام في منصبه وسط انفجار نترات الأمونيوم في ميناء بيروت في أغسطس 2020 وأزمة اقتصادية ، كان مدعومًا أيضًا من حزب الله. في الواقع ، لم يؤيد ترشيحه إلا نواب 8 آذار / مارس.
لكن مواقف المسؤولية هذه تتناقض مع نظرة حزب الله إلى دوره في لبنان. وتنازلت عن مسؤوليتها عن حوادث مثل التي وقعت في مرفأ بيروت ، رغم ما تردد عن سيطرة حزب الله على الموانئ اللبنانية. في الواقع ، أشار نصر الله نفسه إلى أن منظمته كانت تركز على ميناء حيفا في إسرائيل أكثر من تركيزها على ميناء بيروت في لبنان. تظل الحركة الثورية العابرة للحدود في إيران أولوية حزب الله. يؤدي الفشل المستمر للنظام اللبناني إلى تآكل الدعم الشعبي له وبالتالي يعزز الهدف النهائي لحزب الله - استبدال النظام العلماني اللبناني بجمهورية إسلامية على غرار النموذج الإيراني.
زعيم حزب الله يبايع / يحترم المرشد الأعلى لإيران.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES/GAZA
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh Embracing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
A key ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran is its struggle to “liberate” the Muslim lands of Palestine and the holy city of Jerusalem from what it disparagingly refers to as the illegitimate “Zionist Regime.” To help achieve these ends, Iran has armed, trained, and funded –often working indirectly through Hezbollah – Palestinian terrorist groups, despite the Sunni-Shi’a divide between them.
Iran’s primary goal in supporting various militant Palestinian factions is to foment continuous armed struggle against Israel, weakening a key regional foe and enhancing Iran’s image among Muslim and Arab publics. Arming the Palestinians enables Tehran to play one faction against another, allowing Iran to maintain leverage over the various Palestinian groups and thereby the Palestinian nationalist movement as a whole, bringing them into line with the regime’s foreign policy objectives.
Iran has been the leading sponsor of Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which was founded in 1979, inspired by the success of the Islamic Revolution. Iranian funding of PIJ has been in place since 1987. During the early 1990s, much of PIJ organizational and operations-based support came from the Iranian sub-group Hezbollah. The PIJ is extremely open about Iran being its main supporter: “All of the weapons in Gaza are provided by Iran… the largest share of this financial and military support is coming from Iran.”
Iran has also exerted considerable influence over Hamas, the Sunni Islamist terror group in control of the Gaza Strip. In 1993 Iran, pledged $30 million in annual support for Hamas’ anti-Israel operations. Hamas had consistently enjoyed this financial support, in addition to military training, until disagreements over Iran’s role in Syria created a rift between the two parties. However, Iranian favor has once again returned to Hamas to the tune of “tens of millions of dollars.” Israeli media reported in August 2019 that Iran expressed a willingness to increase its funding of Hamas to $30 million per month in exchange for intelligence on Israel’s missile stockpiles.
Iran’s rapprochement with Hamas is part of an effort to restore Tehran’s image in the Arab and Sunni world, damaged due to its brutality in propping up the Assad regime, through taking back the mantle of anti-Zionist resistance. Restoring ties with Tehran has helped Hamas whether diplomatic isolation as well. In recent years, Hamas has faced a hostile Egyptian government on its Gaza border and fallen out of financial favor with Gulf monarchies, which have quietly aligned their regional policy with Israel and backed more moderate Palestinian forces in response to the Iranian threat.
Hamas had also suffered fractured relations with the Assad regime and Hezbollah, the other primary actors in the Iran-led “resistance axis,” over the Syrian civil war. At Iran’s behest, the Assad regime and Hezbollah have mended ties with Hamas in an effort to rebuild the axis. The effort to reintegrate Hamas into the Iranian sphere of influence furthers Iran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and gives Iran an ongoing outlet to focus on “resistance” activities against Israel.
In June 2018, Israel complained to the U.N. Security Council that it had intelligence showing that Hamas was working with Hezbollah to establish missile factories and training camps for thousands of Palestinian fighters in southern Lebanon. Hamas and Hezbollah’s growing cooperation lays the groundwork for a future struggle with Israel that may encompass fighting on multiple fronts with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxies all joining the fray. In August 2019, a Hamas official warned, “If the Israeli enemy launches aggression against the Gaza Strip, and we estimate that it is a confined battle that will not develop into a war to break us, we will face it alone. But if the enemy [Israel] tries to break the resistance, the rest of the axis will join the battle,” referring to Hezbollah and Iran’s foreign legion of proxy militias.
In September 2019, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh wrote a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei thanking him for Tehran’s “extensive” support and for “Iran’s readiness to equip the resistance for whatever it needs to discharge its duty.”
In February 2020, Israel seized $4 million in funds that it alleged were transferred from Iran to Hamas to help the group build its weapons infrastructure and pay its operatives.
Billboards in Gaza in 2012 thanking Iran for their military support in fighting Israel, particularly their supply of longer-range rockets to target Israeli cities.
Iran’s influence extends far beyond financial support, particularly in Gaza. Iran has supplied and trained groups like Hamas and the PIJ in the use of longer-range rockets. In 2002 Israeli forces intercepted the Gaza-bound Karine A vessel in a raid in the Red Sea, which was loaded with 50 tons of advanced weaponry from Iran. Iran has supplied ever increasingly sophisticated and powerful munitions to Hamas with technology including UAVs being delivered to these groups via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran has supplied Hamas with IEDs, anti-tank munitions, and provides training for up to 6 months in modern tactical warfare for Hamas operatives.
In May 2019, Hamas’s leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar thanked Iran for providing the group with increasingly sophisticated and long-range rocketry. Following a weekend in which Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired 700 rockets into Israeli territory, Sinwar stated, “Iran provided us with rockets, and we surprised the world when our resistance targeted Beersheba. Had it not been for Iran, the resistance in Palestine would not have possessed its current capabilities.”
Iran is now also building a loyalist, “Hezbollah-style terror group” in the Gaza Strip. Known as Al-Sabirin, the organization is funded directly by Tehran. Through Al-Sabirin, Iran is also seeking to make inroads into the West Bank. On January 31, 2018 the State Department designated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Harakat al-Sabireen, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), noting that they are “sponsored and directed by Iran.”
Hezbollah itself has stepped up its activities in the West Bank in recent years. In January 2016, Israeli security forces dismantled a five-man terror cell in the West Bank city of Tulkarem recruited by Hezbollah’s Unit 133, which is tasked with recruitment and planning attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. The cell – recruited and trained by Hassan Nasrallah’s son, Jawad – was instructed to gather intelligence on IDF training facilities for an attack, and to prepare a bomb for use in a suicide operation against Israeli civilians. In July 2019, Shin Bet announced that it had thwarted another cell—an Iranian espionage network—based in Syria, which was recruiting operatives in the West Bank and Gaza via social media.
The emergence of these cells within the Palestinian territories appears indicative of a longer-term Iranian strategy. In the short term, Iran is content to support and ally with extremist groups with shared anti-Israel aims, such as Hamas and PIJ, to fulfill broad geopolitical objectives. Al-Sabirin’s name, which translates to “the patient ones,” attests to a desire to anchor proxies loyal to Iran and who share its ideological predilections in the Palestinian territories further down the road if conditions on the ground are conducive. In fact, there have been signs of increased coordination within Iran’s broader Axis of Resistance in furtherance of this project. In 2019, Iran’s supreme leader reportedly proposed PIJ form a joint operations room in Gaza with Hezbollah and Iraqi militias.
Due to its implacable opposition to Israel’s existence, Iran has waged proxy warfare in the Palestinian Territories, backing the most recalcitrant elements of Palestinian society, including terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran’s bid to hijack the Palestinian national movement serves to undermine efforts for a peaceable, negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In January 2020, following the Trump Administration’s unveiling of the “Deal of the Century,” the IRGC called for resistance against the peace plan and praised the Palestinians for “standing alone” against it.
Iran has also stood against regional initiatives to accept Israel’s existence and normalize its position in the Middle East. After Israel and the UAE announced a deal establishing full diplomatic relations in August 2020, Iran condemned the normalization of ties and vowed that the UAE’s decision would strengthen the forces of the “resistance axis” in the region. Iran similarly condemned Bahrain in September 2020 after it decided to normalize ties with Israel, saying, "The rulers of Bahrain will from now on be partners to the crimes of the Zionist regime as a constant threat to the security of the region and the world of Islam.”
SYRIA
The Iranian-Syrian alliance stretches back over three decades, constituting one of the most enduring partnerships among authoritarian regimes in the region. Iran views the maintenance of Assad’s control in Syria as a check against Sunni power in Syria and the greater Middle East. Through the Assad regime, Iran is further able to project its influence throughout the Levant.
In a testament to Assad’s utility, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies have played a critical role in saving and sustaining Bashar al-Assad’s regime amidst the ongoing Syrian Civil War, which began as a popular uprising in March 2011 as the “Arab Spring” swept the region. Officials of the Iranian regime have gone so far as to refer to Syria as “the 35th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us.”
Syria has been so strategically vital to Iran because it provides a logistical “land bridge” to Hezbollah and access to Mediterranean ports, which is central to its regional ambitions. The regime also wants to deny a victory to its regional Sunni rivals, and further consolidate its “Shia Crescent” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Not only does Iran remain the country's “closest ally,” declaring it will “support Syria to the end,” but Iran increasingly plays the commanding role in the Syrian Civil War against the rebel forces. In August 2012, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) General Salary About declared, “Today [Iran is] involved in fighting every aspect of a war, a military one in Syria and a cultural one as well.”
This steadfast support has continued throughout the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, a purported moderate. Speaking with Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi in August 2013, Rouhani vowed, “the Islamic Republic of Iran aims to strengthen its relations with Syria and will stand by it in facing all challenges. The deep, strategic and historic relations between the people of Syria and Iran… will not be shaken by any force in the world.” In December 2020, Rouhani reaffirmed Iran’s support for the Assad regime, declaring, “The Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its support to the Syrian government and people as our strategic ally and we will stand by Syria until its final victory.” He added Iran will continue fighting in Syria until the Golan Heights are liberated from Zionist occupiers.
Iranian Economic Support to the Assad Regime
In support of the Syrian regime's campaign of mass murder to suppress the popular unrest, Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power. In the early stages of the conflict, Iran offered limited assistance to the Assad regime in the form of technical and financial support, facilitated primarily through the IRGC Quds Force. Beginning in 2012, Iran's economic support increased markedly to forestall the collapse of the Assad regime.
It is unknown exactly how much Iran has spent to prop up the Assad regime, but estimates range from $30 billion to $105 billion in total military and economic aid since the onset of the conflict. In 2017, Iran, through its state-run Export Development Bank, extended Syria an additional $1 billion credit line, adding to the $5.6 billion total credit lifeline Iran provided the Assad regime in 2013 and 2015 to keep the Syrian economy afloat and facilitate Syrian purchases of petroleum. Iran’s provision of credit to the Assad regime underscores its increased reliance on Iran for its survival.
Tehran has also greatly expanded its economic ties with Damascus during the Civil War, boosting bilateral trade from a peak of $545 million per year before the war to over $1 billion annually by 2017. Trade volume appears to have dipped since then according to Iranian state media reports, but in 2019, an Iranian official stated Iran’s intention to boost trade volume by an additional $500 million to $1 billion annually within two years. To that end, Iran and Syria held a series of bilateral visits and economic delegations in 2019 aimed at cementing stronger economic ties. Most notably, in January 2019, Iran’s vice president traveled to Damascus and inked agreements solidifying banking cooperation, for Iran to boost Syria’s power generation, and for Iran to restore railways and other infrastructure, all with an eye toward boosting trade.
Iran has used its own oil tankers to transport Syria's embargoed crude oil, disguise its origins, and get it to market. Iran stepped up its provision of diesel fuel to the Syrian regime during the Civil War, fueling the Syrian Army’s heavy ground vehicles – including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy transport. Tehran has done so through direct shipments as well as by providing Assad with credit lines to purchase the fuel. Additionally, Iran has provided Syria diesel in exchange for gasoline, a boon of hundreds of millions of dollars to the cash-strapped Syrian government.
Reports by Syrian government media indicate that in October 2018, Iran, hit hard by the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, suspended its credit line to the Assad regime, triggering a fuel crisis. For at least a period of six months, Iran was unable to export fuel to Syria, but in May 2019, an Iranian oil tanker successfully delivered a shipment of oil, easing the crisis.
Iran’s efforts to provide oil to fuel Syria’s war machine have been ongoing, as evidenced by the July 2019 interdiction by British Royal Marines of an Iranian oil tanker off the coast of Gibraltar carrying 2 million barrels of oil suspected of being destined for Syria. The British operation highlighted Iran’s efforts to maintain its lifeline to the Assad regime in violation of EU and other international sanctions.
Iranian Military Support to the Assad Regime
Iran has effectively been in charge of planning and leading the conduct of the conflict.
The Iranian regime's support for Syria is broad and comprehensive, and includes deploying Iranian troops inside Syria, technical assistance, and training for Syrian forces. As early as December 2013, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Maj.-Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari boasted, "[Iran has] special forces transferring experience and training who are doing advisory work."
Initially, Iranian support was limited to advising and training Assad regime forces. Iranian support to the Syrian regime increased markedly in 2012 as Assad risked losing power due to rebel advances and force attrition. Iran began sending hundreds of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij fighters to Damascus, stanching and eventually reversing Assad’s losses. Tehran has subsequently greatly expanded its support to include deploying thousands of IRGC, Artesh and Basij fighters to take a direct part in the Syrian Civil War’s battles.
Iran has engaged in the facilitation of arms transfers to the Assad regime and proxy militia forces in Syria, including Hezbollah, in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. These arms transfers have helped Assad regain lost territory and have given Iran and its proxies the ability to project power in the Levant militarily, threatening Israel, Jordan, and other U.S. allies and interests in the region.
Iran has sent Syria vast quantities of military equipment throughout the civil war, including rifles, machine guns, ammunition, mortar shells, and other arms, as well as military communications equipment. These arms transfers began prior to the introduction of Resolution 2231 and continue today. Most of Iran's arms shipments to Syria are supplied via air transport. From January 2016 to August 2017, over 1000 flights departed from points in Iran and landed in Syria, indicating an ongoing complex logistical operation to resupply the Assad regime. Israel has referred Iran to the U.N. Security Council on two separate occasions for alleged violations of Resolution 2231 in Syria, once for the launching of an “Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),” described as having been launched into Israeli airspace to attack Israeli territory, and once for Iran’s delivery of a Khordad air defense system (which Israel destroyed before it could be set up) to an Iranian air base.
As the tide of the war has shifted in Assad’s favor, Iran has moved to establish a permanent military presence in Syria, effectively transforming the country into a forward operating base from which to threaten and occasionally attack Israel. Iran has set about constructing military bases and weapons production and storage facilities to that end. Israel has targeted Iranian weapons depots on numerous occasions, vowing to strike against Iranian military entrenchment in Syria when it feels threatened. One prominent node for Iranian entrenchment is the T4 airbase, where Iran has sought to establish “a large air force compound under its exclusive control,” according to Haaretz military correspondent Amos Harel. Iran shares the large base with Russian and Syrian forces, but operates independently of them, controlling T4’s western and northern sides.
Highlighting the Iranian danger, in February 2018, Iran launched an armed drone from Syrian territory into Israel, an attack that Israel ultimately repelled. In August 2019, Israel struck Quds Force and Iran-backed Shi’a militia targets in Damascus who were preparing to launch explosives-laden “killer drones” into Israel’s north. Iran’s use of Syria as a staging ground for UCAV attacks against Israel illustrates the extent to which Iran has a free hand to operate in Syria, as Assad has allowed Iran to undertake such operations even though they put his own forces at risk.
In September 2019, Western intelligence sources alleged, and satellite imagery confirmed, that Iran’s Quds Force is constructing a military complex, the Imam Ali compound, near the border with Iraq where it will house thousands of troops. Some of the buildings at the compound appear to be heavily fortified, heightening suspicions that they may be used to store sophisticated weaponry including precision-guided missiles. The compound was partially destroyed by airstrikes after its existence was exposed, but as of November 2019, Fox News has confirmed that construction of the base is ongoing.
In December 2019, Fox News reported that Iran is building an underground tunnel at the Imam Ali complex to store missiles and other advanced weaponry.
While most of Iran’s military hardware and personnel are concentrated in Syria’s north, Israel is increasingly concerned about the transfer of sophisticated weaponry and precision-guided missiles to Hezbollah forces in the country and over Iranian efforts to establish a presence in the Golan Heights, overlooking Israel’s northern border. In November 2019, an Israeli military official alleged, "there are Iranian Quds forces in the Golan Heights and that's not fear-mongering, they're there." In January 2021, the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division reportedly transferred 56 short and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles over the Iraqi border to Iraqi Hezbollah forces positioned in Syria’s eastern Deir Ezzor province, disguising the weaponry by using vehicles meant for transporting produce. Iran’s military entrenchment has eroded Syria’s sovereignty and invited increased Israeli strikes on Syrian territory, indicating that as Syria’s civil war calms down, the country may become embroiled as a battleground between Israel and Iran and its proxies.
In July 2020, Iran and Syria signed a comprehensive agreement to enhance their cooperation in the military and defense spheres. Both sides indicated that the agreement was meant to resist U.S. attempts to pressure and isolate Iran and Syria. Iran noted that as part of the agreement, it will “strengthen Syria’s air defense systems within the framework of strengthening military cooperation between the two countries.” Israeli media reported in August 2020 that Israel has carried out over 1,000 airstrikes in Syria since 2017 largely in service of its effort to prevent Iranian military entrenchment in Syria and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. During that period, Israel has reportedly taken out over one-third of Syria’s air defenses in order to ensure its continued aerial freedom of operation.
Iran’s pledges to bolster Syria’s air defenses and increase military cooperation with Damascus show that it remains committed to entrenching itself militarily in Syria.
As Iran has entrenched, it has used Syria as a weapons transshipment hub, establishing supply lines to provide drones, precision-bombs, and other advanced weaponry to Hezbollah and Iran-backed Shia militias. Israel has shown repeatedly that it is willing to strike Iranian targets in Syria to stanch the Iranian proliferation threat and rein in the arms supply network Iran is building in the region. As such, Syria is likely to remain a battleground for direct Israeli-Iranian confrontation for the foreseeable future.
Provision of Proxies
Iran has deployed an estimated 20-30,000 of its regional proxies from around the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan into the country. As the Assad regime has weakened, it has become increasingly reliant on the local and foreign Shia militias beholden to Iran to seize and hold territory. Former IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani was at the head of these forces until his death in a U.S. drone strike on January 3, 2020, coordinating activities among the various Shia mercenary forces and ensuring that their activities fulfilled Iranian foreign policy objectives.
These duties have now shifted to Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Ghaani. Tehran’s command and control over its proxy forces in Syria has likely suffered since the transition, as Ghaani does not have the stature of Soleimani or benefit of close relationships with the heads of various militias that made Soleimani so effective. In June 2020, Ghaani reportedly visited the Syrian side of the Abu Kamal border crossing with Iraq, where he vowed that Iran would continue to fight the “Zionist regime” and U.S. Ghaani’s visit was meant to show that like Soleimani, Ghaani is capable of clandestinely visiting Iranian proxies around the region, and as an opportunity for Ghaani to assert his control over and consolidate unity among the various factions Soleimani previously commanded.
Hezbollah
Under Iranian direction, Hezbollah entered the Syrian Civil War on Assad’s side in 2011 and has been critical to his regime’s survival. Hezbollah spent the first two years of the civil war denying its involvement, but in April 2013, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah openly declared Hezbollah’s foray into the conflict, urging his followers to not “let Syria fall in the hands of America, Israel, or Takfiri (radical Sunni) groups.” Since then, Hezbollah has deployed approximately 5,000-8,000 fighters into the Syrian arena, and between 1 and 2,000 of them have been killed. The group has been involved in almost every major battle of the war, including the repeated offensives in Qalamoun and Zabadani, but most critically the battle of Aleppo. The battle of Aleppo ended with a regime victory in December 2016, irreversibly turning the tide of the Syrian war.
After averting the direct rebel threat to Damascus, Hezbollah has acted to re-extend the regime’s control over all of Syria. In May of 2017, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah announced the withdrawal of his forces from positions on the Lebanese-Syrian border. Rather than demobilizing, however, they were sent deeper into eastern Syria as part of a large-scale operation to retake the country’s borders with Jordan and Iraq and to join with Popular Mobilization Forces charging from the Iraqi side of the border.
Hezbollah has made clear it intends to remain in Syria and is laying permanent groundwork for the day after an eventual Assad victory. Hezbollah has reportedly established missile bases in Qusayr and Qalamoun to better protect its longer-ranger projectiles from Israeli aerial attacks. It has also engaged in large-scale sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from the area to secure its Beqaa Valley and Baalbek strongholds across the border and guarantee its land corridor to Damascus. Critically, an Iranian-Qatari brokered population swap deal in April 2017 transferred almost all remaining Sunni combatants from the area, in exchange for the Shiite residents of besieged Foua and Kefraya.
The group is also aiming to establish a presence on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, a matter of concern for the Israelis. This would not threaten Israel’s military superiority in the area, since the Israelis occupy the high-ground and the flat terrain between the Golan and Damascus can easily be seized by IDF ground troops. However, it could serve as a base for Hezbollah to carry out limited strikes against soldiers or civilians in Israeli-held territory in a future conflict.
Israeli security officials say Hezbollah is also exploiting the chaos of Syria’s civil war to clandestinely import advanced, balance-altering weapons – allegedly including chemical weapons, SCUDs, and Yakhont anti-ship missiles – from its Iranian patron and the Assad regime. These weapons would be a major upgrade from the short-range and unguided katyusha rockets that have been the group’s traditional mainstay, and which make up the bulk of its oft-mentioned arsenal of 150,000 rockets. Israel considers this a red line and has repeatedly intercepted and destroyed these weapons with air strikes.
Additional Shiite Militia Proxies
In addition to Hezbollah, Iran has mobilized, funded, and armed thousands of Shiite fighters to defend Assad’s regime, inflaming Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions in the process. These fighters, were under the unified command of Qassem Soleimani, have been recruited from across the Arab and Islamic world, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
An estimated 3,000 Afghans, primarily immigrants and refugees residing in Iran and Syria, form the Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatemiyoun Division). Approximately 1,000 Pakistanis, who receive training from the IRGC Quds Force in Mashad, comprise the Zainabyoun Brigade, which the Iranian press describes as an elite assault force. The core forces of the Zainabyoun Brigade reportedly initially came from Al-Mustafa International University, an Iranian network of colleges and seminaries tasked with disseminating Iran’s religious ideology around the world.
Iran’s efforts to recruit Shia militants to the Syrian war effort from around the Middle East and beyond center upon the salaries it offers its disaffected conscripts. Recruits are offered monthly salaries on a sliding scale dependent on country of origin, basic and advanced military training, and Iran offers to pay the families of “martyrs” for their children’s education and to send family members on annual pilgrimages to holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Beyond cash and benefits, Iran relies heavily on religious and ideological appeals to find recruits willing to be martyred for the cause. The New York Times detailed how recruiters affiliated with the IRGC appeal to the Shia faith and identity of potential fighters, reporting that once recruited, fighters train near Tehran where “Iranian officers delivered speeches invoking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the revered seventh-century Shiite figure whose death at the hands of a powerful Sunni army became the event around which Shiite spirituality would revolve. The same enemies of the Shiites who killed the imam are now in Syria and Iraq, the officers told the men.”
Iran has also sought to frame the fighting in Syria as an urgent necessity to defend Shia shrines. The golden-domed Sayyeda Zainab shrine, strategically located in south Damascus, is especially central to this narrative of Iran and its proxy fighters. Attendees at funerals for Lebanese Hezbollah and other Shia militia fighters killed in Syria frequently chant “labaykya Zainab (At your service, O Zainab), and these same groups have also produced propagandistic songs featuring the slogan and prominently placed the shrine’s iconic dome in the background of martyrdom posters of fallen fighters.
One of the most important and notorious of those groups is Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, which played a critical role in the battle for Aleppo and is alleged to have summarily executed 82 civilians – including 11 women and 13 children. Harakat al-Nujaba, an offshoot of Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, recently formed a “Golan Liberation Brigade” to fight the Israelis.
In March 2021, Syrian opposition media outlets reported that the Iran-backed militia Kataib al-Imam Ali had opened a recruiting station in the regime-controlled city of Aleppo. Kataib al-Imam Ali was created in Iraq in June 2014 as the armed wing of an Iraqi political party, Harakat al-Iraq al-Islamiyah (The Movement of the Islamic Iraq). The group has been uniformed and well-armed since its inception. It was founded by Shibl al-Zaydi, a U.S. designated terrorist who has leveraged his position as head of a powerful militia to become one of the richest men in Iraq with a large business empire and controlling interest in the Iraqi Ministry of Communications.
Assad regime defense officials reportedly approved of the group’s recruitment operations and have made allowances not to pursue army defectors and dodgers of compulsory military service if they instead join the militia. The militia appeals to economically disenfranchised Syrian youth, offering $200 per month for married recruits and $150 per month for single individuals. The group’s nascent presence in Syria is a testament to many of the Iran-backed Shi’a militias' transnational nature.
Local Actors
One of the most pernicious ways in which Iran has sought to bolster its influence along sectarian lines in Syria has been by providing ideological guidance for the transformation of elements of Bashar Al-Assad’s Popular Committees – small, localized defense units – and other irregular pro-Assad armed groups into increasingly “regularized” militias, known as the National Defense Forces (NDF), modeled after Hezbollah. Iran’s Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah personally oversaw the creation of the NDF, whose local Syrian recruits receive training in urban and guerilla warfare from both the IRGC and Hezbollah at facilities in Syria, Lebanon and Iran.
The NDF operates as a part-time volunteer reserve force of the Syrian Army which has opted to fight on behalf of the Assad regime against rebel groups, filling the void created by the depletion of Assad’s Syrian armed forces since their creation in mid-2012. Iran has taken the lead in the “rebranding, restructuring, and merging” of the Popular Committees into the NDF, with Hezbollah playing a critical role in providing military and ideological training. In a similar vein to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed NDF operate in a localized context and are ostensibly Syrian actors, but their true raison d’etre is the propagation of Iran’s supranational revolutionary project.
In addition to replicating the Hezbollah model in Syria, Iran’s role in creating the NDF also mirrors the establishment of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Both the Syrian NDF and Iraqi PMF are governmentally sanctioned and financed paramilitary outfits whose fighters are more numerous and powerful than their respective states’ official defense forces. The NDF is now by far the largest militia network in Syria, estimated at approximately 50,000 primarily Alawite members as of late 2015. The NDF has participated in critical battles, including the 2016 Aleppo offensive and the campaign to dislodge ISIS, contributing to Assad’s surging territorial reconquests.
Iran’s Gains in Syria
The successes of Hezbollah, the NDF, and affiliated Iranian proxy forces in the Syrian theater have expanded Iran’s objectives within Syria. What began as an Iranian-sponsored attempt to create a “Useful Syria” from the regime’s major cities and economic centers has now become a more ambitious campaign to retake the entire country. With the Assad regime and allied forces – including Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy militias – retaking the key Iraqi-Syrian border crossings of al-Tanf and Abu Kamal, and Iranian-sponsored members of the Popular Mobilization Forces reaching the Syrian border from the Iraqi side, Iran has completed a critical link in its project to create a land corridor to the Mediterranean.
Iran’s provision of economic, military, and proxy support was critical in stabilizing Assad’s rule until Russia’s entry into the Syrian Civil War in 2015. Following the regime’s 2016 victory in Aleppo, the war’s momentum swung decisively in Assad’s favor. In 2018, the Assad regime further consolidated its control in brutal fashion, pressing an offensive in Eastern Ghouta, the last rebel-held bastion in the Damascus suburbs. The Eastern Ghouta campaign forced the remnants of rebel forces and thousands of civilians to flee to Idlib province, which is now Syria’s last-remaining rebel-held enclave on the western Syrian corridor that runs from Damascus-Homs-Hama-Idlib-Aleppo.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has euphemistically declared that Idlib, whose population has doubled to 3 million people since the war broke out due to internally displaced refugees, must be “cleaned out” of opposition forces. The U.N. has warned that a regime offensive backed by Iran and Russia would result in the “worst humanitarian catastrophe” of the century as there are no longer any opposition-held areas left in Syria where those fleeing can evacuate. In September 2018, Russia and Turkey negotiated a tenuous truce to forestall a bloodbath in Idlib, but the Assad regime has referred to the deal as a “temporary one.”
In October 2019, President Trump hastily announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeast Syria and signaled his intention to eventually fully end U.S. involvement in Syria. The announcement effectively strengthened Iran’s hand in Syria and will facilitate further Iranian military and commercial entrenchment, presenting a self-inflicted setback to the administration’s concerted effort to pressure Tehran.
The U.S. military presence in northeast Syria provided a deterrent that allowed the Kurdish-led SDF to control a full third of Syria’s territory, home to the country’s richest oil and agricultural resources, keeping it out of the hands of the Russia-Assad-Iran alliance for seven years.
The U.S. withdrawal has also increased the chances of a Russian-Syrian-Iranian onslaught in Idlib. Turkey, concerned that an offensive would further increase refugee strains, had stood as a major impediment to an Idlib offensive. In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal, however, Turkey has had to draw closer to Russia, neutralizing its protestations over a “fait accompli” in Idlib.
At a December 2019 summit in Kazakhstan as part of the Russia-Iran-Turkey negotiation track, Turkey joined Russia and Iran in expressing concern over the increased presence of “terrorist groups” in Idlib, and pledged to work cooperatively to pacify the situation. The pledge came in the wake of increased activity by Syrian armed forces, in conjunction with Russian air power, on the outskirts of Idlib in the weeks prior. In November 2019, Syrian and Russian forces killed at least 22 civilians in attacks on an internally displaced person (IDP) camp and a maternity hospital in villages around Idlib, according to opposition monitoring groups. These events indicated that a full-scale offensive in Idlib was imminent.
The Kazakhstan summit ended without a definitive ceasefire agreement, and in the days that followed, Syrian government forces, Russia, Hezbollah, Iran and other pro-Assad militias launched an offensive to retake Idlib. Nearly one million Syrians, roughly half of them children, were displaced by the fighting, straining U.N. relief efforts. In March 2020, Russia and Turkey agreed to a ceasefire, but the situation remains volatile.
Iran’s Long-Term Influence in Syria
The Assad regime’s re-consolidation of power, a project in which Iran played an indispensable role, has given Iran and its proxies a foothold to project economic, military, and cultural influence into Syria for years to come. Iran’s Syrian intervention has paid off, guaranteeing both Assad’s survival and dependence on Tehran given his weakened position both domestically and within the international community. For its efforts to shore up Assad, Iran and the IRGC – which has a hand in virtually every sector of the Iranian economy – have the opportunity to further carve out a long-term role for themselves in Syria, utilizing the cover of military and economic projects to export the Islamic Revolution by creating Shi’a militias and quasi-state institutions loyal to Iran and its Supreme Leader within Syria.
In September 2017, Iran’s Research Institute of Petroleum, a governmental research institute affiliated with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), announced that Iran is planning to build an oil refinery in Syria’s western city of Homs once the civil war ends as part of a consortium involving Iranian, Syrian, and Venezuelan companies. The consortium has already begun pursuing international investments for the project, which will take an estimated $1 billion to construct and will have a projected refining capacity of 140,000 barrels per day.
The Homs oil refinery is one of a series of business deals Iran has announced that indicates that the Islamic Republic is poised to take a leading role in the rebuilding of Syria, after playing a pivotal role in the nation’s destruction. Also in September 2017, Iran signed a series of lucrative agreements to restore Syria’s power grid and in January 2017, the Iranian government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated entities inked major mining and telecommunications agreements with Damascus. The telecommunications agreements are particularly alarming, as they may provide Iran with communications-monitoring and intelligence-gathering tools.
In January 2018, Iran announced plans to establish Islamic Azad University branches in Syrian cities, a development that indicates that Iran is investing in spreading its Islamic Revolutionary ideology in Syria.
In November 2019, Iran and Syria announced a memorandum of understanding to establish three joint state-owned companies that will focus on reconstructing infrastructure and residential properties.
Both the NDF and Lebanese Hezbollah appear to be permanent fixtures in Syria as well, remaking a country that historically “was home to many competing ideological forms of Shiism” in Iran’s image. Hezbollah and the NDF’s secure Iranian alignment and loyalty to its revolutionary ethos ensures that Iran will be the dominant military and cultural power in Syria for the foreseeable future. As Iran has further entrenched its control and influence over Syria, it and its proxies have taken on increasingly confrontational postures against the U.S. and Israel. Iran has engaged in armed drone skirmishes with Israeli forces, and conducted a missile strike against ISIS fighters that landed within three miles of U.S forces. These incidents indicate that Iran plans on using Syria as a base from which to provoke the U.S. and its allies and is not concerned about dragging Syria into its proxy battles.
YEMEN
The Houthi flag and slogan, which reads “God is great/ Death to America/ Death to Israel /God curse the Jews/ Victory to Islam,” draws inspiration from the Iranian regime slogans “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”.
Iran continues to destabilize Yemen by supporting the Shiite Houthi insurgency(directly, and indirectly through Hezbollah) from the beginning of its war against the Sunni-dominated, internationally recognized central government in 2004. Iran uses the Houthis and Yemen as a proxy and base, respectively, to attack its leading Sunni rival, Saudi Arabia. Iran’s support for the Houthis has helped the latter expand their control of Yemeni territory; capture Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and dethrone Yemen’s central government; and survive a massive air bombardment from a Saudi-led coalition seeking to restore the former Yemeni regime.
Tehran’s aid to the group has included funding, Iranian fighter pilots, arms shipments, and military training. In 2009, Iran’s support for the Houthis was exposed when the Yemeni navy apprehended an Iranian ship off the Yemeni coast in the Red Sea carrying weapons experts and anti-tank weapons sent to replace wounded “Iranians fighting alongside Houthi rebels” against Yemeni government forces. The Houthis’ motto, “God is great! / Death to America! / Death to Israel! / God curse the Jews! / Victory to Islam!” which emulates the Iranian regime’s own “Death to America” slogan and extremist ideology, underscores the group’s links to Tehran. Iranian meddling in Yemen includes arms shipments and support for assassinations and coups; the use of missiles, drones, and roadside bombs; and the deployment of foreign regional proxies, namely Lebanese Hezbollah, on the ground.
According to the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, throughout 2019, Hizballah, the IRGC-QF, and other Iran backed terrorist groups continued to exploit the political and security vacuum created by the ongoing conflict between the Yemeni government under the leadership of President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, recognized by the UN Security Council as the legitimate government of Yemen, and the Iran-backed Houthi militants. Additionally, IRGC-QF has exploited the conflict to expand its influence in Yemen.
On December 5, 2019, as part of its reward offer for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program requested information on the activities, networks, and associates of Abdul Reza Shahla’i, a Sana’a, Yemen-based high ranking commander of the IRGC’s Qods Force (IRGC-QF).
On January 18, 2020, ballistic missiles struck a mosque at the al-Estiqbal military camp in Marib, killing at least 116 people in what was reportedly one of the deadliest attacks in the civil war. There were no immediate claims of responsibility but Yemen’s internationally recognized government blamed Houthi rebels. The United States blamed Iran, which denied involvement. On January 20, 2020 government forces fought Houthi rebels east of Marib, killing senior Houthi commander Jaber Al Muwaed.
On December 30, 2020, the Houthis launched an attack against the civilian airport in Aden, where the new Saudi-backed Yemeni government was deplaning. The attack resulted in the deaths of 27 people, including three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Afterwards, the Trump administration designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
Arms Shipments and the Houthi Coup
According to a senior American intelligence official in 2012, intercepted phone conversations between smugglers and the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) revealed that Iran has been “using small boats to ship AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and other arms to replace older weapons used by the rebels.” In early 2012, the Yemeni government intercepted another shipment of Iranian manufactured material which was destined for a Yemeni Houthi businessman to create explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which are advanced improvised explosive devices able to penetrate armored vehicles and which killed hundreds of American servicemen during the Iraq War. A year later, in January 2013, a joint U.S.-Yemeni military operation intercepted an Iranian shipment of surface-to-air missiles, C4 explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades in the Arabian Sea. American officials have likened Iran’s shipments of “relatively small, but steady stream of automatic rifles, grenade launchers, bomb-making material and several million dollars in cash” to the kinds of materiel Iran provides to its allies in Syria and Iraq.
In September 2014, the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and pushed out Yemen’s central government four months later. Iranian support for Houthi operations then increased considerably, with Tehran shipping the group 160 to 180 tons of arms and military equipment in March 2015.On September 27, 2014, while speaking about the Houthi coup, Ali Riza Zakani, a member of Iran’s parliament and a close confidante of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, stated that Iran is in a phase of “Grand Jihad” and “Three Arab capitals (Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad) have already fallen into Iran’s hands and belong to the Iranian Revolution,” and called Sanaa the fourth. A Saudi-led coalition has undertaken military operations to defeat the Houthis and restore the Yemeni government to power.
Missile and Drone Attacks on Saudi Arabia
Since 2015, the Houthis have used Yemeni territory under their control as launching pads to fire more than 100 missiles and drones at Iranian rival Saudi Arabia. Such strikes have landed on multiple cities, including Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Targeted locations include the king’s official residence, military bases and encampments, oil refineries, the Riyadh international airport, and shopping malls. Further, as the Congressional Research Service notes, “Since 2016, the Houthis have periodically targeted commercial and military vessels transiting and patrolling the Red Sea using naval mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-ship missiles, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). Some of the weapons used reportedly have been supplied by Iran, including sea-skimming coastal defense cruise missiles.”
Evidence indicates that Iran is arming and, in some cases, directing the Houthis in their missile campaign, contrary to Tehran’s denials and in violation of an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015. An independent U.N. monitoring panel stated in November 2017 that remnants from four ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia likely came from the Iranian-made and designed Qiam-1 missile. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Pentagon officials displayed debris from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia, claiming that the markings on and designs of the missiles demonstrated that they were made by Iran. The U.N.’s finding of Iranian origins in the Houthis’ missiles continued well into 2018, with panel after panel affirming the Iranian connection. One U.N. report from January 2018 found that recently inspected missiles and drones “show characteristics similar to weapons systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and, therefore, the panel “continues to believe” that Tehran is giving missiles and other arms to the Houthis. Indeed, Iran has recently bragged openly about their support for the Houthis, with an IRGC general telling IRGC-controlled media that the Guards had instructed the Houthis to attack two Saudi oil tankers in July 2018.
Iran reportedly also continues to provide other forms of arms to the Houthis. For example, an independent watchdog organization claimed in March 2018 that roadside bombs found in Yemen resemble ones used by Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain.
Hezbollah’s Assistance to the Houthis
The Iranian proxy group Hezbollah, a terrorist organization operating in Lebanon and elsewhere, also has longstanding ties to the Houthis, who are fellow Shiites. Working with Iran, Hezbollah reportedly operates on the ground in Yemen, arming, training, and even fighting for the Houthis. Analysts have speculated that the Houthis seek to replicate in Yemen Hezbollah’s Lebanese model of a “state within a state.”
Hezbollah operatives themselves have reportedly admitted that the group has a ground presence in Yemen and fights directly against the Saudi-led coalition. A Hezbollah commander told the Financial Times that the group began training with the Houthis in 2005. “They trained with us in Iran, then we trained them here and in Yemen,” he said. A Hezbollah commander reportedly told researchers in 2016, “After we are done with Syria, we will start with Yemen, Hezbollah is already there. Who do you think fires Tochka missiles into Saudi Arabia? It’s not the Houthis in their sandals, it’s us.”A Houthi militia leader confessed after surrendering to coalition forces in 2017 that Iran and Hezbollah operatives were operating covert training facilities in Yemen.
Coalition and United Nations officials have also claimed that Hezbollah is aiding the Houthis. Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi claimed in 2016 that Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah wrote to him that “Our fighters arrived in Yemen to teach the Yemeni people the essence of governing.”In June 2018, the anti-Houthi coalition stated that coalition forces had killed eight Hezbollah members in Yemen. That August, Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., said that not enough attention was paid to “not only the direct assistance the Al Houthi militia receives from the Iranian regime, but also the existence of Hezbollah commanders on the ground.” He added that a coalition raid on a Houthi site had “revealed a Hezbollah operative training, advising [the Houthis] on asymmetric warfare, and showed background portrait [sic] of Iran’s ‘Supreme Leader’ on militia’s computer [sic].”Ambassador bin Salman also tweeted evidence of ties between the two groups, including footage of a “Hizballah operative in Yemen advising the Houthis to use deception tactics such as using water tanks to store weapons, and smuggling fighters through civilian vehicles; endangering the lives of Yemeni civilians.” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has repeatedly accused Iran and Hezbollah of being responsible for missile attacks targeting Saudi territory. In July 2018, a coalition spokesman said “Hezbollah is the Houthis’ greatest arms supplier” and said the coalition had evidence that Hezbollah experts were on the ground in Yemen, training the Houthis and giving them a military communications system. And in October 2018, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen.
In 2018, Nasrallah stepped up his group’s public support for the Houthis. On June 29, Nasrallah paid tribute to the Houthis in a public speech, even saying, “I wish I could be one of your fighters and fight under the guidance of your brave and dear leaders.” In mid-August, Hezbollah used its annual commemoration of its 2006 war against Israel to display pro-Houthis propaganda—namely, as the National reported, “a reconstruction of a bus hit by a Coalition airstrike which had killed a number of civilians and children in Saada province several days earlier that the Arab-led force later said had been a mistake. Organizers used the bus for journalists to photograph, complete with actors impersonating the victims, special effects smoke, red lighting and fake blood in an evocative image of the war.” And on August 19, Hezbollah disclosed that Nasrallah had met recently with a Houthi delegation in Beirut.
Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has reciprocated, praising Iran and thanking Nasrallah for his “solidarity.” He also promised that Houthis would fight alongside Hezbollah or Palestinian militants in a future war against Israel.
Saleh Assassination
In December 2017, the Houthis assassinated former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, their erstwhile enemy and then ally, after he turned against them again and proposed reconciliation with the Saudi-led anti-Houthi coalition. Iranian leaders and regime-affiliated media outlets celebrated Saleh’s killing and said the Houthis are inspired by Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and similar to Iranian-supported militant groups in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.
A shipment of Iranian weapons destined for the Houthis seized by American naval forces in the Arabian Sea in 2015.
Afghanistan
Active proxy groups & Military forces
IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)
Support for Afghan Proxies
Iranian influence in Afghanistan has deep-seated roots reaching back to the 15th century when the Afghan city of Herat was the capital of the Persian Empire. Iran also shares ties with various groups of Afghanistan, particularly the Persian-speaking Tajiks and the Shia Hazara. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Iran supported Shia resistance efforts and opened its borders to Afghan refugees. After the first Gulf War, Iraq, which had posed the major proximate threat to Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was effectively neutralized. Neighboring civil war-torn Afghanistan supplanted Iraq as the main threat facing Iran, and in 1996, the extremist Sunni jihadist movement, the Taliban, rose to power, backed by Iranian geopolitical rivals Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
During the Afghan Civil War, Iran defensively sought to cultivate military and political influence in Afghanistan by backing elements hostile to the Taliban with ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic affinities toward Iran, namely the Hazaras in the West of the country and Tajiks in the North who formed the core of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, more commonly referred to as the “Northern Alliance.” By 1998, Iran had amassed 70,000 IRGC troops along its border with Afghanistan to defend against spillover from the conflict next door.
In August of 1998, tensions between Iran and the Taliban reached a boil after the Taliban captured the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, a cosmopolitan and diverse city with a large Shia Hazara population. The Taliban brutalized the town’s Hazaras, raping and massacring hundreds. Amidst the chaos, Taliban soldiers besieged an Iranian consulate and executed nine Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist. As demands for retaliation grew, Iran stationed an additional 200,000 conventional forces along the border.
Ultimately, however, Iran, which has since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War sought to avoid direct confrontation and heavy casualties, refrained from direct intervention and opted instead to escalate its strategy of proxy warfare. Iran ramped up its support for the Northern Alliance, with former IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani reportedly taking an active role in directing the Northern Alliance’s operations from Tajikistan, where the group had established bases from which to launch attacks into Afghanistan and coordinate resupply of its fighters.
The Taliban offered Al Qaeda safe haven for its terrorist operations, leading the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to authorize covert assistance to the Northern Alliance in 1999 to facilitate operations against the growing Al Qaeda threat. This marked a rare instance of the U.S. and Iran independently backing a guerilla movement, albeit for different ends. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda, America initiated hostilities against the Taliban government, a welcome development for Iran at the time.
While wary of the expansion of the U.S. military footprint in its environs, Tehran was willing to leverage American military might to neutralize its most pressing adversary. The U.S. and Iran held several rounds of secret shuttle diplomacy, leading to covert cooperation that went as far as Iran sharing intelligence detailing Taliban positions for the U.S. to strike. While many in Iran were skeptical about the efficacy of partnering with the U.S., Soleimani saw the situation as a win-win for Iran. He posited that even if the U.S. ended up betraying Iran after toppling the Taliban, their enemy would be defeated, and America would end up entangled in Afghanistan, similar to the Soviet Union. “Americans do not know the region, Americans do not know Afghanistan, Americans do not know Iran,” warned Soleimani.
Relations between the U.S. and Iran would ultimately sour following President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union, in which Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were labeled the “axis of evil,” and the subsequent March 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iran’s threat perception changed as the U.S. was no longer the distant “Great Satan,” but a proximate threat with an expanding military footprint in the region that had toppled two neighboring governments and was ultimately bent on Iranian regime change.
As such, Iran’s primary objectives in Afghanistan shifted toward ensuring that the country remained sufficiently weak as to preclude a further military threat toward it, and imposing costs on the U.S. to compel its withdrawal. Iran’s long-term interest is in a stable, friendly, and weak Afghanistan in order to prevent drug trafficking, terrorism, and refugee flows from spilling over into Iran. To that end, Iran pursued foreign direct investment in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and assistance in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, energy, and communications.
At the same time, however, Iran played what former Defense Secretary Robert Gates termed a “double game” in Afghanistan, seeking good relations with the central government while also modestly funneling arms to insurgents of various ethnic and ideological stripes through the IRGC-Quds Force, according to U.S. intelligence. The haphazard way Iran has sought to play all sides off each other in pursuit of its short-term interests imperils its longer-term interest in a stable, friendly Afghanistan. It has also engendered enmity among broad swathes of the population, as evidenced by pushback and demonstrations against Iranian meddling in recent years.
Support for the Taliban
Demonstrating the lengths Tehran was willing to go to repel U.S. influence, one of the primary groups the Quds Force began arming was the Taliban. Beginning in 2006, the IRGC-Quds Force began “training the Taliban in Afghanistan on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons” in addition to providing armaments “including small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives.” Iran has also permitted the Taliban free movement of foreign fighters through Iranian territory to support its insurgency in Afghanistan.
On October 25, 2007, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the IRGC-Quds Force under Executive Order 13382 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury added three Iranian IRGC Quds Force operatives and one “associate” to its list of global terrorists for their efforts to “plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan” including providing “logistical support” in order to advance Iran’s interests in the region. The Treasury Department has stated that these designations “[underscore] Tehran’s use of terrorism and intelligence operations as tools of influence against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.”
In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned additional individuals who spearheaded cooperation between the Taliban and Tehran. They included Mohammad Ebrahim Owhadi, a Quds Force operative, who, according to the U.S. government, provided the Taliban Shadow Governor of Herat Province “with military and financial assistance” in exchange for Taliban forces launching attacks against the Afghan government, and Esma’il Razavi, who ran a training camp for Taliban forces in Birjand, Iran, which, according to the U.S. government, “provided training, intelligence, and weapons to Taliban forces in Farah, Ghor, Badhis, and Helmand Provinces.” News reports indicate that Iran directly supported the Taliban offensive against Farah Province in May 2018.
Brigadier-General Esmail Ghaani became the head of the IRGC Quds Force, following the death of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Ghaani has deep contacts and experience in Afghanistan—dating back to the 1980s. After Soleimani’s demise, Iranian media began circulating unconfirmed reports that high-ranking Central Intelligence Agency officials perished in a plane crash in Taliban-controlled territory of a Bombardier E-11A electronic surveillance plane, and that one of those officials was involved in the death of Soleimani. Days later, the U.S. government announced only two U.S. Air Force pilots were killed in the incident, and there was no indication of hostile action in the downing of the jet. There has been speculation that the circulation of this story was part of an Iranian propaganda campaign. Such allegations also come on the heels of an increasingly close relationship between Tehran and the Taliban, with Iranian media repeatedly interviewing its officials.
Days after the plane crash, the head of U.S. Central Command warned of a “worrisome trend” in intelligence pointing to an uptick of Iran’s malign behavior in Afghanistan. This could be evidence of the new Quds Force commander seeking to deploy his existing network inside Afghanistan against U.S. forces.
On February 29, 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha that envisioned a complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for assurances from the Taliban that the group would prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The agreement was meant to pave the way for negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government on a power sharing agreement that would shape Afghanistan’s future.
Since the agreement was reached, Iran has continued to play a destabilizing double game in Afghanistan, seeking to ensure that it will retain influence in the country regardless of the outcome of the peace process. On the one hand, Iran has sought to ingratiate itself with the Afghan government and has encouraged various stakeholder factions from across the political spectrum in the government to form a joint committee to ensure a unified front in future talks with the Taliban. Iran even offered to play a mediation role in future talks as well between the government and Taliban. In July 2020, Iran announced that it had formulated a "Comprehensive Document of Strategic Cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan" whose fundamental principles are "non-interference in each other's affairs," "non-aggression" and "non-use of each other's territory to attack and invade other countries."
At the same time, though, Iran has continued to maintain contact with the Taliban to retain leverage over the Afghan government and peace process. Moreover, Iran is evidently working to sabotage the peace process by backing more radical elements and splinter groups from the Talibanwho oppose negotiations and wish to keep fighting the central government and U.S. military presence.
Iran, which has been hard hit by sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic, is likely in the immediate term to avoid proxy confrontation with the U.S., instead pursuing strategic patience in the hopes that the U.S. will withdraw on its own accord. However, its influence over radical Taliban elements ensures that it is capable of resuming hostilities against the U.S. and turning Afghanistan into a proxy war battlefield at a time of Tehran’s choosing.
This reality was underscored by an August 2020 CNN report that U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Iran had provided bounty payments to the Haqqani Network, a terrorist offshoot of the Taliban, for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in recent years. The report found that Iran had paid bounties for six Haqqani Network attacks in 2019 alone, including a major suicide bombing at Bagram Air Base in December 2019 that killed two civilians and wounded over 70 people, including four U.S. service personnel. The U.S. ultimately refrained from retaliation for the attack in order to preserve the peace process with the Taliban, but Iran’s role in financing attacks targeting the U.S. shows the potential for Tehran to play spoiler through its ties to the Taliban.
Economic and Cultural Influence
Tehran has also dramatically expanded its economic ties with Afghanistan to buy influence in the country. According to the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce, Iran surpassed Pakistan as Afghanistan’s largest trading partner from March 2017-2018—with Iran exporting goods worth $1.98 billion. While foreign investment supports Afghanistan’s development, Iranian investment seeks to undermine NATO and the Afghan regime’s efforts to stabilize the country. In 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai admitted that Iran was paying his government $2 million annually, but U.S. officials believe that this is just the “tip of the iceberg” in a multitude of Iranian cash inflows to Afghan groups and officials.
Iran’s economic influence in Afghanistan is best illustrated by its development of the western city of Herat, where Iran has developed the electrical grid, invested heavily in the mining industry, and invested over $150 million to build a school, mosque, residential apartments, a seven-mile road, and even stocked store shelves with Iranian goods. According to the head of Herat’s provincial council, Nazir Ahmad Haidar, “Iran has influence in every sphere: economic, social, political and daily life. When someone gives so much money, people fall into their way of thinking. It’s not just a matter of being neighborly.”
Furthermore, Iranian influence in Afghanistan extends past its economy and into Afghan culture and religion. Coordinated by an official under the office of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran has funded the development of Shia organizations, schools, and media outlets in order to expand Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Mohammad Omar Daudzai, Afghanistan’s former Ambassador to Iran, has stated that “thousands of Afghan religious leaders are on the Iranian payroll.”
Recently, Iran has bridged its international regional influence by creating the IRGC-backed Fatemiyoun Division, a group of Afghan Shi’a fighting in support of the al-Assad regime of Syria. Often recruiting Afghan Shia refugees in Iran, and to a lesser extent, Shias within Afghanistan itself, the IRGC offers a $500/month stipend and Iranian residency in return for joining pro-Assad militias. The Fatemiyoun was upgraded from a brigade to a division in 2015, indicating the militia’s ranks had grown to at least 10,000 fighters, with some estimates reaching as high as 20,000. The Fatemiyoun militants in Syria have typically been dispatched to dangerous fighting on the front lines with inadequate training and tactical preparation, leading to high casualty rates. Fatemiyoun survivors and deserters have described heavy-handed recruitment methods, including threats of being expelled from Iran and handed over to the Taliban in order to coerce marginalized Afghan refugees to fight in a war they have little understanding of or connection to. Human Rights Watch has identified at least 14 minors who fought and died in Syria for the Fatemiyoun Division.
Lastly, Iran has even weaponized Afghanistan’s environment. For example, the governor of Helmand Province accused the IRGC in 2017 of giving the Taliban weapons to attack Afghanistan’s water infrastructure so that Iran could receive a larger portion of water from the Helmand River.
Bahrain
Active proxy groups & Military forces
IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)
The tiny island Kingdom of Bahrain, ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family, has been acutely vulnerable to interference from its much larger Shiite neighbor, Iran, given that approximately 70-75 percent of its population is Shiite. Iran’s ties to Bahrain are more than sectarian. Successive Persian empires controlled Bahrain for centuries, ending in the 1780s. Not until 1970 did Iran drop its territorial claims to Bahrain. Nevertheless, since 1979, the Iranian regime has persistently attempted to return Bahrain to Shiite rule and has even referenced its former sovereignty over the island. In September 1979, only months after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile, Sadegh Rouhani, a leading cleric, warned that if the emir of Bahrain did “not want to stop oppressing the people and restore Islamic laws, we will call on the people of Bahrain to demand annexaton to the Islamic government of Iran.”
The saber-rattling has continued ever since the onset of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. In 2009, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, a senior official and advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, bluntly stated that “Bahrain was the fourteenth province of Iran until 1970,” precipitating a crisis between the two countries. Similarly, in 2018, Hossein Shariatmadari, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative at the Kayhan newspaper, reiterated his statement from 10 years prior that “Bahrain is ours [Iran’s]” and that the people of Bahrain want their country to become part of Iran again.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah Activity in Bahrain
In 1981, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), a militant Shiite organization established by Ayatollah Hadi Modarresi, Ayatollah Khomeini’s personal representative to Bahrain, attempted a coup. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Bahraini authorities also worked to incapacitate the country’s local branch of Hezbollah.
Beginning in the 1990s and continuing to the present day, Bahraini authorities accused Iran of spearheading a series of “popular petitions” to reform the Bahraini monarchy. For example, authorities in Manama accused a Shiite cleric, Ali Salman, of organizing such a drive 1994 which acquired, according to some estimates, as many as 25,000 signatures. This led to both Bahrain and Iran recalling their respective ambassadors, with Bahraini authorities alleging that the petitions were “planned and backed by foreign propaganda” rather than homegrown. Separately, in June 1996, Bahraini authorities accused Iran of organizing a coup.
Since anti-monarchy protests began in Bahrain in 2011 amid the wider “Arab Spring,” Tehran has attempted to exploit these demonstrations for sectarian purposes and to undermine the monarchy. Bahrain has repeatedly warned Iran to refrain from meddling in its internal affairs and said in 2011 that it “had foiled a decades long terror plot by outsiders,” referring to the Iranian regime. The main opposition party’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Isa Ahmad Qassem, is, according to a Bahrain expert, “a religious representative of Khamenei” who “propagates his religious authority” and “encourages people to follow [Khamenei] rather than other ‘sources of emulation.’”
On April 22, 2013, Bahraini authorities arrested eight of its citizens for plotting with an Iranian Revolutionary Guard member to assassinate Bahraini officials and target government buildings and the international airport. Later that same year, on December 30, the Bahraini coast guard interceptedan Iranian shipment of over 220 pounds of C4 explosives, 50 hand grenades, land mines, and detonators labeled “made in Syria” that were en route to Shiite opposition groups in Bahrain. During interrogation, the detained suspects “admitted to receiving paramilitary training in Iran.”
In September 2015, Bahrain uncovered an illicit Iranian weapons factory aimed at supplying militant elements within the opposition with heavy weaponry to fuel unrest in the kingdom. Bahrain recalled its ambassador to Iran the next month. In November of that year, Bahrain arrested 47 members of an Iran-linked cell that was plotting to execute imminent attacks.
In June 2016, two men alleged to have “received training in weapons and explosives from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards” planted a bomb that killed a Bahraini woman. In February 2017, a 14-member cell linked to Iran bombed a bus carrying Bahraini police officers, wounding five. According to Bahraini officials, six of the arrestees received military training in IRGC camps, five in Kata’ib Hezbollah facilities, and three in Bahrain. In March 2017, Bahraini authorities broke up an IRGC-linked terror cell, which they accused of plotting to assassinate government officials and attack police and U.S. military targets. In March 2018, the government revealed that it had arrested 116 members of an IRGC-run group that was planning to attack senior Bahrain officials and critical infrastructure. Manama claimed that almost half of the arrestees received training from the IRGC in Iran or in Iran-linked facilities in Iraq and Lebanon.
In April 2019, a Bahraini court sentenced to prison 139 Bahrainis, of whom 69 received life sentences (25 years), on terrorism 113 charges; the court also ordered the revocation of their citizenships. The GOB accused the individuals of forming an organization it referred to as “Bahraini Hizballah” with the intention of carrying out attacks in Bahrain.
The al-Ashtar Brigades
In January 2016, Bahrain caught an IRGC- and Hezbollah-backed cell plotting a series of bombings, claiming that one of the main suspects had gone to Iran and met with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who provided him $20,000. The cell was allegedly part of the Shiite al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB), which have claimed responsibility for more than 20 attacks in Bahrain since 2013, including one in March 2014 that killed three police officers, two Bahraini and one from the United Arab Emirates.
In February 2018, the AAB changed their logo to adopt IRGC branding, in order to reflect their role as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against the U.S. and its allies. The AAB also reaffirmed its fealty to the Iranian regime, stating, “We believe that the commander and ruler of the Islamic religion is the line of the two imams, Khomeini and Khamenei…” It also outlined new objectives, including cultivating a “resistance and martyrdom culture” and “creat[ing] a deterrent force,” that indicate its intention to create a Hezbollah-style “state within a state” in Bahrain.
Bahrain added the AAB to its list of terrorist groups in 2014. In March 2017, the U.S. State Department designated two AAB members, Alsayed Murtadha Majeed Ramadhan Alawi and the Iran-based Ahmad Hasan Yusuf, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).In July 2018, the State Department designated the AAB itself as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and an SDGT, stating that AAB “members have received weapons and explosives from Iran, training at IRGC-funded camps in Iraq, and senior AAB members have taken refuge in Iran to evade prosecution by Bahraini authorities.” In August of that year, State Department also designated an Iran-based AAB senior member, Qassimal-Muamen, as an SDGT.
On October 31, 2019, the Bahraini judiciary issued life sentences to five nationals for “forming a terrorist cell” affiliated with al-Ashtar Brigades. In February 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Spring-inspired political uprising.
Additional Shiite Militant Groups
In addition to AAB, a variety of other Shiite militant groups remain committed to the overthrow of the Bahraini monarchy given its Western-leaning geopolitical posture. The Al-Mukhtar Brigades, which has similar branding to the IRGC and which the British Home Office listed as a proscribed organization in December 2017, maintains an online presence which has promoted terrorism via social media. Saraya al-Muqawama al-Shabiya is another similar organization with purported connections to the IRGC. It reportedly was behind the detonation of an IED near the U.S. Fifth Fleet and an attack on a branch of the National Bank of Bahrain. Bahrain’s chief of public security estimated in May 2018 that since 2011, AAB and other Shiite militant organizations causes 22 deaths and more than 3,500 injuries to policemen.
After the killing of former Commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force Qassem Soleimani, reports circulated about the formation of the Qassem Soleimani Brigades, dedicated to avenging his death. Bahraini officials alleged that they foiled a terror plot in early 2020, which involved an attempted attack on a visiting foreign delegation, using an explosive device. In December 2020, the United States imposed terrorism sanctions on the al-Mukhtar Brigades under Executive Order 13224. In the designation, the U.S. government cited the significant risk of committing acts of terrorism, as well as past plots against U.S. personnel in Bahrain and the offering of cash rewards for the assassination of Bahraini officials.
Kuwait
Active proxy groups & Military forces
IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)
Iranian proxies were responsible for a series of coordinated bombings in Kuwait in 1983, which struck the U.S. embassy (pictured), among other targets.
Iran has long attempted to increase its influence over Kuwait due to the latter’s sizeable Shiite minority (approximately 30 percent of its population), extensive oil reserves, proximity to the Gulf, and importance to American and Saudi Arabian security.
The strained relationship between Kuwait and Iran intensified during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. In response to Kuwait shipping Iraqi oil, Iran began attacking Kuwaiti ships and refineries and engaging in terrorist attacks on Kuwaiti soil. In 1983, operatives of Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Al Da’wa targeted, as one analyst noted, “the American and French embassies, the Kuwait airport, the grounds of the Raytheon Corporation, a Kuwait National Petroleum Company oil rig, and a government-owned power station” in coordinated suicide bombings which killed six people and wounded another ninety. Consequently, Kuwait imprisoned 17 people for their involvement in these attacks, including several members of Hezbollah.
In order to pressure Kuwait to release these 17 prisoners, known as the “Kuwait 17,” Iran directed Hezbollah to engage in a campaign of terrorism and kidnappings throughout the Middle East. In 1984, Kuwait Airways Flight 221 was hijacked on its way to Pakistan and diverted to Tehran. Although Iran eventually arrested the hijackers, the perpetrators murdered two employees of USAID, were never tried in Iranian court, and were permitted to leave the country. The next year, Hezbollah attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait by driving a bomb-laden vehicle into the leader’s motorcade.
More recently, Kuwait has uncovered Iranian covert operations designed to undermine American-Kuwaiti military cooperation and inflame sectarian tensions among Kuwait’s Shiite minority. In April 2011, the Kuwaiti foreign minister reported the discovery of an Iranian spy cell that had operated in Kuwait since the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. The cell “monitored the U.S. military presence and possessed explosives to bomb ‘strategic’ facilities” in addition to lists of “names of officers” and “extremely sensitive information.” This announcement followed the March sentencing of two Iranians and one Kuwaiti for spying on behalf of Iran and coincided with the expulsion of several Iranian diplomats from Kuwait.
In August 2015, Kuwaiti officials foiled a plot by Hezbollah to carry out attacks in the country, planned by 25 of its own nationals and one Iranian. Authorities seized a huge arms cache that they said was smuggled from Iraq and hidden underneath houses close to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. In Kuwait’s Al-Abdali area, they discovered a total of 42,000 lbs. of ammunition, 144 kg of explosives—including C4—68 weapons, and 204 grenades. The cell was charged with plotting with Iran and Hezbollah to destabilize Kuwait’s national security. Subsequently, the Kuwaiti government closed Iran’s cultural mission and expelled some Iranian diplomats.
In June 2017, Kuwait’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions of 21 members of the al-Abdali terrorist cell, noting the group’s intention to carry out terror attacks around the country. Kuwait protested to Lebanon that Hezbollah, which is part of the Lebanese government, played an active role in training the members of the terror cell.
In March 2016, Kuwait expelled over 70 Lebanese nationals with permanent residency status for alleged links to Hezbollah. The move came shortly after the GCC declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
In May 2018, Kuwait joined the U.S. and other Gulf states in sanctioning 9 Hezbollah-affiliated persons and entities, but did not join the other governments in designating Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as well.
In July 2020, Kuwaiti authorities broke up a money laundering cell with alleged ties to Hezbollah. The cell, whose mastermind was an Iranian resident of Kuwait, was reportedly active for five years. The members reportedly laundered over 3 million dinars ($9.8 million USD) through online auctions of luxury goods using a Gulf bank in their operations, with the money subsequently being sent to an unnamed regional state.
Despite Iran’s meddling and support for terrorism in Kuwait, Kuwait has sought to cultivate good relations with Tehran, placing it at odds with other GCC nations. Kuwait opted to maintain diplomatic ties with Iran following the 2016 attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran, which led to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain severing relations with Iran. Kuwait has also sought to serve as a mediator in the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain; a dispute which centers in part on Qatar’s links to Tehran.
Saudi Arabia
Active proxy groups & Military forces
IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)
Iranian Meddling and Terrorism Within Saudi Arabia
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saudi officials have feared growing Shiite influence in their country and the region as the Iranian regime has sought to “export” the revolution throughout the Persian Gulf. An estimated 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 25 million citizens are Shiite Muslims, the vast majority of whom are concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. Shiites are the majority in key towns such as Qatif, Dammam, and al-Hasa, which, as the BBC notes, “are home to the largest oil fields and processing and refining facilities.”
Consequently, Iran has often sought to stir unrest among the Shiite population in these areas. The Islamic Revolution sparked significant unrest in Qatif in November 1979. Emboldened by Ayatollah Khomeini’s claims that hereditary monarchies were incompatible with Islam, Shiites in Qatif mobilized against the Saudi government.
Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration that he was the leader of not only Iran but the entire Muslim world threatened the Saudi monarchy’s religious legitimacy as custodians of Islam’s holiest sites. On July 31, 1987, Iranian Revolutionary Guard operatives incited Iranian pilgrims to riot outside the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the annual hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. As 155,000 Iranian pilgrims chanted “Death to America!”and confronted Saudi riot police, a stampede ensued, resulting in the death over 400 people, including hundreds of Iranian pilgrims and Saudi policemen.
Shortly following these attacks, Tehran’s proxy Hezbollah carried out Iranian interference in Saudi Arabia via attacks on the Saudi petrochemical industry, targeted assassinations of Saudi politicians worldwide, and a foiled plot involving explosives placed near Mecca’s Grand Mosque.
On June 25, 1996, Saudi Hezbollah—directed and funded by Iran—bombed the Khobar Towers housing compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where U.S. and allied forces supporting air operations in Iraq were housed. The attack killed 19 American servicemen and one Saudi, and injured hundreds of others. Iran is also believed to be responsible for the August 2012 cyber attack on ARAMCO, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company. This attack disabled over 30,000 computers operated by ARAMCO, disrupting operations for nearly two weeks.
Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia ratcheted up further in 2016 after an Iranian mob, chanting “Death to the Al Saud family,” ransacked and set fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the Saudi consulate in Mashhad on January 3 after Saudi Arabia executed outspoken Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Riyadh accused al-Nimr of involvement in Iran-linked Shiite attacks on policemen and civilians in 2011. Iran's Supreme Leader proclaimed that “the unjustly spilled blood of this oppressed martyr will no doubt soon show its effect and divine vengeance will befall Saudi politicians” describing the execution as a “political error.”
Al-Nimr’s execution prompted unrest and anti-monarchy protests in Qatif, his home province. While most of the protests were peaceful, some skirmishes between Shiites and the Saudi security forces resulted in deaths or injuries. Further, in December 2016, Saudi Judge Mohammed al-Jirani was kidnapped in Qatif; his body was found one year later. Asharq al-Awsat reported that an Iranian cleric promulgated a fatwa ordering terroriststo kidnap and kill al-Jirani.
The Saudi government clamped down on Qatif and protests became more violent in 2017 and 2018, as Shiite fighters attacked and killed or wounded Saudi police and soldiers. The Saudi government blamed the violence on and prosecuted terrorists, including Saudis allegedly working for Iranian proxies like Hezbollah. Riyadh has pushed back against Hezbollah, joining the U.S. Treasury Department and other Gulf states in sanctioningHezbollah officials and entities in May 2018.
On May 14, 2019 unmanned aircraft systems targeted two pumping stations on the East-West pipeline carrying crude oil from Dhahran to Yanbu. Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthi militants claimed responsibility, but the U.S. government later concluded the systems were launched from Iraq. On June 12, 2019 Saudi-led coalition senior officials reported a cross-border cruise missiles attack at Abha International Airport, injuring 26 civilians. Yemen-based Iran-backed Houthi militants claimed responsibility for this attack. On August 17, 2019 Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militants struck a natural gas liquids plant at Shaybah oilfield in the Kingdom’s Empty Quarter with drones. The drone strike damaged the facility and caused a fire. No deaths or casualties were reported.
On September 14, 2019, Iranian attacks hit the Abqaiq and Khurais oil processing facilities in the Eastern province, initially taking 5.7 million barrels per day of crude oil production offline. Although Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militants claimed responsibility for the attack, investigations led by Saudi Arabia and the United States concluded the Iranian government was behind the attack. Saudi Aramco resumed pre-attack production levels less than two weeks later, ahead of schedule.
In early 2021, Iraq-based members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance claimed responsibility for targeting Riyadh with “missiles or drones.” The incident was more serious than initial reports indicated—with the Saudi royal palace in Riyadh being targeted. There is an emerging pattern of using Iraqi militants in Iran’s proxy network—as opposed to the Houthis in Yemen—to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia, following the May 2019 attack on the Saudi oil pipeline. The Houthis also claimed responsibility for a March 7 attack on Ras Tanura port, but there are some indications it originated elsewhere. In early 2021, there was an uptick in drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia after the Biden administration revoked the Houthis’ terrorism designations.
Iranian Meddling and Terrorism Against Saudi Interests in the Region
Saudi officials have viewed Iranian support for Shiite unrest in allied Bahrain during the “Arab Spring” as a “fundamental risk” to Saudi national security. Consequently, Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 troops to Bahrain in 2011 in an effort to stabilize the country and prevent Iranian and Shiite influence from spreading to the Saudi mainland. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has supported Yemeni government forces against the Iranian-backed Shiite Houthi rebels. Iran’s involvement in Yemen has led the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, to conclude that the Saudi government must “deal with Iran's aggression in the region.” This Saudi determination resulted in the formation of a coalition with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates which began launching airstrikes against the rebels in Yemen in March 2015. Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf harshly condemned Iran’s support for the Houthis and its meddling in the affairs of Arab states: “Their interference has ignited instability, they have created havoc in our part of the world…”
Since 2015, the Houthis have used Yemeni territory under their control as launching pads to fire more than 100 missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia. Such strikes have landed on multiple cities, including Riyadh, the Saudi capital. Targeted locations include the king’s official residence, military bases and encampments, oil refineries, the Riyadh international airport, and shopping malls. Further, as the Congressional Research Service notes, “Since 2016, the Houthis have periodically targeted commercial and military vessels transiting and patrolling the Red Sea using naval mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-ship missiles, and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). Some of the weapons used reportedly have been supplied by Iran, including sea-skimming coastal defense cruise missiles.”
Evidence indicates that Iran is arming and, in some cases, directing the Houthis in their missile campaign, contrary to Tehran’s denials and in violation of an arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council in April 2015. An independent U.N. monitoring panel stated in November 2017 that remnants from four ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis into Saudi Arabia likely came from the Iranian-made and designed Qiam-1 missile. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Pentagon officials displayed debris from missiles fired into Saudi Arabia, claiming that the markings on and designs of the missiles demonstrated that they were made by Iran. The U.N.’s finding of Iranian origins in the Houthis’ missiles continued well into 2018, with panel after panel affirming the Iranian connection. One U.N. report from January 2018 found that recently inspected missiles and drones “show characteristics similar to weapons systems known to be produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and, therefore, the panel “continues to believe” that Tehran is giving missiles and other arms to the Houthis. Indeed, Iran has recently bragged openly about their support for the Houthis, with an IRGC general telling IRGC-controlled media that the Guards had instructed the Houthis to attack two Saudi oil tankers in July 2018.